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REINSURANCE CONTRACTING WITH ADVERSE SELECTION  
AND MORAL HAZARD: THEORY AND EVIDENCE  
 
By 
 
ZHIQIANG YAN 
 
July 2009 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Ajay Subramanian 
 
Major Department: Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
 This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent 
model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes 
graphically various forms of separating Nash equilibria. In the second essay, we use 
panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance for the period 1995-2000 to test for the 
existence of adverse selection and moral hazard. We find that (1) adverse selection is 
present in private passenger auto liability reinsurance market and homeowners 
reinsurance market, but not in product liability reinsurance market; (2) residual moral 
hazard does not exist in all the three largest lines of reinsurance, but is present in overall 
reinsurance markets; and (3) moral hazard is present in the product liability reinsurance 
market, but not in the other two lines of reinsurance. 
Essay 1: Reinsurance Contracting with
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Zhiqiang Yan
Georgia State University
July 2009
Abstract
The adverse selection and moral hazard problems have been widely discussed in
the context of insurance markets. However, previous studies on asymmetric informa-
tion usually treat the adverse selection and moral hazard problems separately, though
it is quite possible that they may coexist and interact with each other. This paper builds
a principal-agent model to examine the optimal contracts in a competitive reinsurance
market facing the adverse selection and moral hazard problems simultaneously. This
paper finds that: (1) there are several forms of separating Nash equilibria, (2) sepa-
rating Nash equilibria may not exist, (3) no agent is offered full coverage, and (4) the
positive correlation property between insurance coverage and risk type found in the
case of pure adverse selection still holds.
1
1 Introduction
The adverse selection and moral hazard problems have been widely discussed in the context
of insurance markets. However, previous studies on asymmetric information usually treat
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems separately, though it is quite possible
that they may coexist and interact with each other. The aim of this paper is to examine
the optimal contracts in a competitive reinsurance market facing the adverse selection and
moral hazard problems simultaneously.
Similar to Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997), we develop a one-period principal-agent
model with the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in a com-
petitive environment. Then we characterize graphically various types of separating Nash
equilibria, and analyze the characteristics of optimal contracts in equilibria. We find that:
(1) there are several forms of separating Nash equilibria, (2) separating Nash equilibria
may not exist, (3) no agent is offered full coverage, and (4) the positive correlation prop-
erty between insurance coverage and risk type found in the case of pure adverse selection
still holds.
In the present paper, although our model setup is similar to Chassagnon and Chiappori
(1997), we contribute to the literature by applying more straightforward mathematical tech-
niques, that is, change-of-variable method proposed by Laffont and Martimort (2002) and
the familiar Kuhn-Tucker conditions, to the derivation and characterization of separating
Nash equilibria, which resembles the results in Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review on
the theoretical literature of adverse selection and moral hazard. Section 3 develops a simple
principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard problems simultaneously
in the context of perfect competition, and graphically characterizes possible separating
equilibria. Section 4 presents conclusions of this paper.
2
2 Literature Review
Inspired by the seminal works of Arrow (1963) and Akerlof (1970), numerous papers the-
oretically examined adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976) and moral hazard problem (Pauly, 1974; Stiglitz, 1977; Shavell, 1979; Lambert,
1983; Smith and Stutzer, 1995).
One important work on adverse selection is Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), which pro-
posed to use price-quantity contracts to solve the adverse selection problem in a competitive
environment. They proved that only a separating equilibrium (in a Nash sense) could exist,
and that, in equilibrium, high-risk individuals self-selected into a contract with full insur-
ance coverage at a higher unit price, while low-risk individuals self-selected into a contract
with partial coverage at a lower unit price. Moreover, a separating equilibrium may not
exist under certain conditions.
Stiglitz (1977) extended the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model to the case of monopoly.
In the monopolistic equilibrium, high-risk individuals purchased complete insurance while
low-risk individuals purchased partial or no insurance. Cooper and Hayes (1987) investi-
gated optimal multi-period insurance contracts with experience rating in both monopolistic
and competitive environments. They demonstrated that the contract for high-risk individu-
als did not reflect loss experience while the contract for low-risk individuals did. Moreover,
if individuals could not commit to multi-period contracts in a competitive setting, low-risk
individuals would receive a contract providing lower expected utility in the first period but
higher expected utility in the second period, comparing to a standard one-period optimal
contract. Correspondingly, firm would make positive profit in the first period on low-risk
individuals, but negative profit in the second period.
A limitation of previous studies on asymmetric information is that they usually treat the
moral hazard problem and the adverse selection problem separately. However, in reality, it
is quite possible that moral hazard and adverse selection may coexist in the same market,
and interact with each other. The approach to deal with each problem separately, one at a
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time, can only provide us limited insight in this situation. Fortunately, people are taking
a more realistic view in modeling asymmetric information problems in insurance markets.
Whinston (1983) considered a single-period social insurance model with moral hazard and
adverse selection and demonstrated that the optimal equilibrium was a pooling one.
Stewart (1994) built a competitive insurance market model with both moral hazard and
adverse selection. In his model, agents only differed with respect to their marginal costs
of loss prevention effort. A separating reactive equilibrium (versus Nash equilibrium as in
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) was characterized. It was shown that, in equilibrium, the
adverse selection and moral hazard problems partially offset each other such that welfare
losses were sub-additive.
Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) set up a model of pure competition facing moral
hazard and adverse selection simultaneously. In the model, there were two types of agents
who could choose privately a discrete level of effort. By using mathematical techniques of
correspondence and sequences, they demonstrated that there were three types of separating
Nash equilibria (in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) and separating Nash equilibria
may not exist under certain conditions. Furthermore, they extended the model to the case of
continuous level of effort, and showed that pooling equilibria were possible in this context.
4
3 A Principal-Agent Model
3.1 The Model Framework
Following the literature, we assume that there are two groups of firms: a risk-neutral rein-
surer group (or principals) and a risk-averse primary insurer group (or agents). A primary
insurance company, even a publicly traded one, can behave in a risk-averse way which ap-
pears for various reasons, such as income tax convexity, agency conflicts, undiversifiable
human capital of senior management, bankruptcy costs, regulatory surveillance, and so on.
We assume that reinsurance markets are competitive and thus each reinsurer is constrained
to earn zero expected profit. Primary insurers have an initial wealth w and possess von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(w) with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0 for all w ∈ R+.
In the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection, defining an agent’s
risk type is a little tricky. In a standard adverse selection setting, the separation of high
and low risk types is clear-cut: a high risk agent has a higher probability of accident, while
a low risk type has a lower probability of accident. However, in the current setting, after
introducing the moral hazard problem into the model of pure adverse selection, a high risk
agent can now expend more effort to reduce his probability of accident, which may turn
out to be actually lower than the probability of accident of a low risk type if she makes less
or no effort. This possibility alone will complicate our traditional definitions of risk types.
A common approach taken in the literature (Stewart, 1994; Chassagnon and Chiappori,
1997) is to define an agent as a high risk type if the agent’s probability of accident is
higher, given the same level of effort expended, than another agent. In Stewart (1994),
the probability function of avoiding a loss was continuous and identical across agents, but
one type of agent had a higher marginal cost of effort, which made him a high risk type.
Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) defined accident probability function in a similar fashion
except that they used a discrete probability function.
In this paper, to make things simpler, we follow Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) to
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define a discrete probability function. Assume that there are two types of agents who differ
ex ante in their risk types θ ∈Θ= {θ,θ}. θ represents a high risk type while θ corresponds
to a low risk type. The two risk types are independently distributed with probabilities ν and
1−ν respectively, which are common knowledge to both agents and principals. Here, when
we say that an agent (i.e., a primary insurer) is a high risk type, it means that the primary
insurer may have inferior underwriting technology, a looser claim adjustment standard, or
poorer risk management expertise, which results in a riskier book of business.
We assume that a type θ agent files a loss claim amounting to l with probability 1−
pi(θ,e), where e ∈ {0,1} is the agent’s loss prevention effort, and thus, the probability that
the agent files no claim is pi(θ,e). In addition, we assume that pi(θ,e) > pi(θ,e) for every
e ∈ {0,1}. Moreover, as in Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997), we rule out the non-generic
case where pi(θ,1) = pi(θ,0) to avoid peculiar equilibria. By exerting effort e, an agent
suffers disutility ψ(e), with ψ(1) = ψ and ψ(0) = 0. To be more tractable, we assume that
the utility function is separable in wealth and effort, which essentially assume away the
non-convexity problem in the indifference curves and the zero expected profit curves.1 In
order to avoid the limited liability problem, we also assume that the endowment of an agent
w is greater than the potential accident loss l, that is, w > l.
For each type of agent θ= {θ,θ}, without reinsurance, its reservation utility is
U0(θ,e) = pi(θ,e)u(w)+(1−pi(θ,e))u(w− l)−ψ(e).
A reinsurer offers primary insurers a menu of reinsurance contracts. Each contract
specifies a premium P to be paid to the reinsurer if no loss claim is filed and an indemnity
I to be paid to the primary insurer if a loss claim is filed. We use the notation δ = {P, I}
to denote the optimal contract offered to type θ primary insurers, and δ = {P, I} to type
θ primary insurers. The equilibrium in question will be a pure Nash equilibrium ( i.e.
a simultaneous game equilibrium) instead of a Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e. a sequential
1Refer to Arnott and Stiglitz (1983) for further details.
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game equilibrium). As shown in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a pooling equilibrium was
not possible in a competitive adverse selection model, and it can not exist in the adverse
selection and moral hazard model as well. Hence, in the following, we will only consider
contracts supporting a separating equilibrium.
A separating Nash equilibrium should be characterized by the following conditions: (1)
for each contract, the principal will earn zero expected profit, otherwise, rival competitors
can undercut the principal and still make a profit until the expected profit goes to zero; (2)
since we assume that premium is actuarially fair, according to standard results of insurance
economics, we know that these risk-averse agents will always be better off by purchasing
reinsurance.
Let us assume that the loss claim l is so large that it is always optimal for the reinsurer
to induce agents to expend effort. In the competitive setting, each contract will maximize
an agent’s expected utility subject to the agent’s participation constraint, adverse selection
constraint, moral hazard constraint, and the principal’s zero expected profit constraint.
When a high risk agent exerts effort and truthfully reports his type to the principal, the
principal maximizes the high risk agent’s expected utility:
V = max
{P,I}
pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ
The high risk agent’s participation constraint is:
V ≥U0(θ,e)≡ max
e∈{0,1}
pi(θ,e)u(w)+(1−pi(θ,e))u(w− l)−ψ(e).
To simplify the analysis, we also assume that
u(w)−u(w− l)≥ ψ4pi(θ)
where4pi(θ) = pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,0). This assumption means that the type θ agent will exert a
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positive effort if he is self-insured, which is consistent with the previous assumption that it
is optimal for a principal to induce an agent to expend a positive effort due to the magnitude
of claim l. With perfect competition and no transaction costs, risk-averse agents will al-
ways prefer insurance to self-insurance. Thus, the participation constraint is automatically
satisfied.
Inducing the high risk agent to exert effort requires the following moral hazard incentive
constraint to be satisfied:
pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ
≥ pi(θ,0)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,0))u(w− l+ I),
which can be reduced to
u(w−P)−u(w− l+ I)≥ ψ4pi(θ) ,
To induce the high risk agent to truthfully report his risk type, the following adverse
selection incentive constraint must be met:
pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ
≥ max
e∈{0,1}
pi(θ,e)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,e))u(w− l+ I)−ψ(e).
Similarly, the low risk agent’s adverse selection incentive constraint is:
pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ
≥ max
e∈{0,1}
pi(θ,e)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,e))u(w− l+ I)−ψ(e).
To simplify the problem, we assume that, by exerting effort, the high risk agent can
increase his probability of no loss more effectively, that is,
pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,0)< pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,0)
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or
4pi(θ)<4pi(θ).
In order to induce the high risk agent to expend effort while selecting the low risk
agent’s contract, it requires that
pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ
≥ pi(θ,0)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,0))u(w− l+ I),
which can be reduced to
u(w−P)−u(w− l+ I)≥ ψ4pi(θ) .
Since u(w−P)−u(w− l+ I)≥ ψ4pi(θ) , which is the moral hazard constraint of low risk
agent, and4pi(θ)<4pi(θ) by assumption, it is easy to see that u(w−P)−u(w− l+ I)>
ψ
4pi(θ) , and thus the high risk agent will always exert effort if he selects contract δ= {P, I}.
Therefore, the adverse selection incentive constraint of the high risk agent becomes
pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ
≥ pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ.
Similarly, for low risk agent to exert effort while choosing contract δ= {P, I}, we must
have
pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I)−ψ
≥ pi(θ,1)u(w−P)+(1−pi(θ,1))u(w− l+ I),
which can be reduced to
u(w−P)−u(w− l+ I)≥ ψ4pi(θ) ,
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and we can prove later that it will not hold.
Moreover, the assumption of competitive reinsurance markets implies that a principal
earns zero expected profit on every contract offered in equilibrium. Thus, given contract
δ= {P, I} offered to type θ, we have:
pi(θ,1)P− (1−pi(θ,1))I = 0
Therefore, every contract δ ∈ (δ,δ) offered to an agent should maximize the agent’s
expected utility subject to a moral hazard constraint, two adverse selection incentive con-
straints and a zero-profit constraint.
However, when it comes to solving the optimization problem, a technical difficulty
arises even in such a simple setting, that is, the maximization program may not be concave
because the concave utility function appears on both sides of adverse selection constraints,
which renders the Kuhn-Tucker method invalid. To resolve this non-concavity issue, we
follow the change-of-variable method proposed by Laffont and Martimort (2002). Let us
define ua = u(w− l+ I), un = u(w−P), ua = u(w− l+ I), and un = u(w−P). Meanwhile,
we denote the inverse function of u(·) by h = u−1. Since u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0 by assumption,
we have h′ > 0, h′′ > 0, and h(·) is convex. Using these new variables, we can obtain that
I =−w+ l+h(ua), P = w−h(un), I =−w+ l+h(ua), and P = w−h(un). Therefore, for
type θ agent, the utility maximization program can now be written as
V = max
{un,ua}
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
subject to the moral hazard constraint:
un−ua ≥ ψ4pi(θ) ,
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the adverse selection constraint for type θ agent:
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
≥ pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ,
the adverse selection constraint for type θ agent:
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
≥ max
e∈{0,1}
pi(θ,e)un+(1−pi(θ,e))ua−ψ(e),
and the zero profit constraint:
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0.
After the change of variables, we can now apply the familiar Kuhn-Tucker procedure
to solve the optimization programming.
3.2 The Zero Profit Curve
Due to the assumption of perfect competition in reinsurance markets, reinsurers make zero
expected profit on each contract offered in equilibrium. In the premium-indemnity (P, I)
coordinates, the zero profit line of type θ ∈Θ= {θ,θ} is given by
pi(θ,1)P− (1−pi(θ,1))I = 0,
which is a ray from the origin with slope 1−pi(θ,1)pi(θ,1) . Here, the origin is the agent’s uninsured
state. Now, let us define wa =w− l+I and wn =w−P, which represent the agent’s incomes
in the states of claim and no claim, respectively. Then (w− l,w) represent the incomes in
the uninsured state. After the change of variables, ua = u(w− l + I) and un = u(w−P)
represent the utilities in the states of claim and no claim, respectively. In the new coordinate
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system of (ua,un), the point E with coordinates (u(w− l),u(w)) is the agent’s utility levels
in the uninsured state, which corresponds to the origin in the coordinate system of (P, I).
Hence, every zero profit curve passes the point E in the new coordinate system. Moreover,
for a type θ agent, the zero expect profit curve is now given by
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0.
According to Implicit Function Theorem, we can obtain,
∂un
∂ua
=−1−pi(θ,1)
pi(θ,1)
h′(ua)
h′(un)
,
and
∂2un
∂u2a
=−1−pi(θ,1)
pi(θ,1)
h′′(ua)
h′(un)
.
Since ua ≤ un, h′ > 0 and h′′ > 0, we have h
′(ua)
h′(un) < 1, ∂un/∂ua < 0 and ∂
2un/∂u2a <
0. Therefore, each zero expected profit curve passes the point E = (u(w− l),u(w)) and
decreases at an increasing rate. Meanwhile, the slope of the zero profit curve decreases in
the probability of no claim pi(·), that is, the zero expected profit curve gets flatter as the
probability of no claim pi(·) gets higher. Since the slope of the agent’s indifference line is
−1−pi(θ,1)pi(θ,1) , we can obtain that −
1−pi(θ,1)
pi(θ,1)
h′(ua)
h′(un) < −
1−pi(θ,1)
pi(θ,1) because of
h′(ua)
h′(un) < 1. It means
that, for a type θ agent, the slope of zero expected profit curve is flatter than the indifference
line, and thus these two cross only once. Hence, the single-crossing property is met.
Before we go into detail about our model of adverse selection and moral hazard, we
first briefly present the standard models of pure adverse selection and pure moral hazard
respectively, which serve as two benchmarks for the model of adverse selection and moral
hazard.
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3.3 The Case of Pure Adverse Selection (PAS)
The competitive pure adverse selection model was proposed and characterized in great
detail in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In the following, we simply present the main
findings in our terminology to facilitate a comparison between the pure adverse selection
model and the model of adverse selection and moral hazard.
In the case of pure adverse selection, risk type is an agent’s private information, and
principals only know that there are two types of agents. However, the principals are able
to observe the actions of agents, or effort that agents exert to prevent losses. Because of
perfect competition by assumption, contract offered to each agent should maximize the
agent’s expected utility subject to the adverse selection constraint of each risk type and the
zero expected profit constraint.
Therefore, for a type θ agent, the optimal contract in equilibrium should maximize the
agent’s expected utility
max
{un,ua}
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
subject to the adverse selection constraint of the type θ agent,
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ≥ pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ, (AH)
and subject to the adverse selection constraint of the type θ agent,
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ≥ pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ, (AL)
and the zero expected profit constraint,
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0
13
It is already a well known result that, in the presence of pure adverse selection, the
principal offers a menu of contracts and the high risk agents self-select into a full insurance
contract but pay a higher unit price for the insurance coverage while the low risk agents
choose a partial insurance contract but pay a lower unit price, as illustrated in Figure 1. For
the sake of completeness, the proof of this result is provided in the Appendices.
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Figure 1: The Case of Pure Adverse Selection
Intuitively, if the adverse selection constraint AL is binding, the indifference line of the
type θ agent must cross the zero-profit curves of both types of agents. In addition, since
pi(θ,1) < pi(θ,1) by assumption, the indifference line of the type θ agent is steeper than
that of the type θ agent, hence, the indifference line of the type θ agent must cross the zero-
profit curves of both types of agents as well. This implies that both agents’ utilities are not
maximized given the constraints, since new contracts can be offered to make both of them
strictly better off. Therefore, the adverse selection constraint AL can never be binding, but
the adverse selection constraint AH should be binding, and the utility of the type θ agent
is maximized when its indifference line is tangent to its zero-profit curve, which occurs at
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the point un = ua. Meanwhile, the maximum utility that the type θ agent can obtain under
the constraints is given by the intersection of its zero-profit curve and type θ’s indifference
line.
3.4 The Case of Pure Moral Hazard (PMH)
In the case of pure moral hazard, agents’ risk types are publicly observable, but agents’
actions, or effort that agents exert to reduce loss claims, are their private information. Since
agents’ types are assumed to be observable by principals, it is enough to formally analyze
one type of agent’s equilibrium contract only. Here we take a high risk type as an example.
Because of perfect competition among reinsurers, the equilibrium contract offered to type
θ should maximize the agent’s expected utility,
max
{un,ua}
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
subject to the moral hazard constraint,
un−ua ≥ ψ4pi(θ) ,
and the zero expected profit constraint for the reinsurance company,
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0.
The above constrained utility maximization program yields the same standard result as
predicted in the moral hazard literature, that is, in the presence of pure moral hazard, a
principal will offer a partial insurance contract to an agent, which will mitigate the moral
hazard issue at hand, and this can be illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The Case of Pure Moral Hazard
3.5 The Case of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
When it comes to contract designing, the majority of studies in the literature treat moral
hazard and adverse selection separately. A few technical issues such as non-convex pro-
gramming and random coverage issues (Winter, 2000) may be responsible for it. In this pa-
per, due to the application of change-of-variable technique and the simplifying assumption
of separable utility function in wealth and effort, we can apply the familiar Kuhn-Tucker
method to solve the maximization problem.
Let λM and λM be the respective multipliers on the moral hazard constraints of the
high and low risk types, λAH and λAL be the respective multipliers on the adverse selection
incentive constraints of the high and low risk types, while λZ and λZ be the respective mul-
tipliers on the zero profit constraints of the high and low risk types. Then the Lagrangian
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function of type θ is:
L = max
{un,ua}
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
+λM[un−ua− ψ4pi(θ)]
+λAH [pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ−pi(θ,1)un− (1−pi(θ,1))ua+ψ]
+λAL[pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ−pi(θ,e)un− (1−pi(θ,e))ua+ψ(e)]
+λZ[pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua))]
Differentiating the Lagrangian function with respect to un and ua respectively leads,
after some simplification, to the following first order conditions:
∂L
∂un
=pi(θ,1)(1+λAH)+λM−λALpi(θ,e)−λZh′(un) = 0; (1)
∂L
∂ua
=(1−pi(θ,1))(1+λAH)−λM
−λAL(1−pi(θ,e))−λZh′(ua) = 0; (2)
By (1)× (1−pi(θ,1))− (2)×pi(θ,1), we can obtain:
λM +λAL[pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,e)] = λZpi(θ,1)(1−pi(θ,1))[h′(un)−h′(ua)] (3)
Similarly, we can derive the first order conditions for the low risk type. Based on these
first order conditions, we can obtain the main results of our model, and the proofs of which
are provided in the Appendices.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, if equilibrium exists, the marginal benefit of effort of each agent
should be no less than its marginal cost of effort, but the marginal benefit of the high risk
type should be no greater than the marginal cost of the low risk type, or mathematically
speaking, ψ4pi(θ) ≤ un− ua <
ψ
4pi(θ) ≤ un− ua. In addition, the type θ agent will not exert
effort when she selects the type θ agent’s contract, that is, e = 0.
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Intuitively, in order to induce an agent to expend effort, the agent’s marginal benefit of
effort should be no less than the marginal cost of effort. Since we assume that the high
risk type agent is more efficient in expending effort, the marginal cost of the low risk agent
must be no less than the marginal benefit of the high risk agent in case there is a separating
equilibrium.
Lemma 2. The adverse selection constraint and the moral hazard constraint of type θ can
not be binding at the same time. In other words, we can not have both λM > 0 and λAL > 0.
According to Lemma 1, e = 0, thus equation (3) becomes:
λM +λAL[pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,0)]
= λZpi(θ,1)(1−pi(θ,1))[h′(un)−h′(ua)].
(4)
Because λZ > 0, λM ≥ 0 and λAL ≥ 0, from equation (4), we know that λM and λAL can
not equal zero simultaneously. Therefore, there are three pairs of (λM,λAL), which are
summarized below.
Case H1: λM = 0, λAL > 0
In this case, the moral hazard constraint of the high risk type is not binding, while the
adverse selection incentive constraint of the low risk type is binding.
Case H2: λM > 0, λAL = 0
In this case, the moral hazard constraint of the high risk type is binding, but the adverse
selection incentive constraint of the low risk type is not binding.
Case H3: λM > 0, λAL > 0
In this case, both the moral hazard constraint of the high risk type and the adverse
selection incentive constraint of the low risk type are binding.
Similar to the derivation of equation (4) for the high risk type, we can obtain the corre-
sponding equation of the low risk type as follows,
λM +λAH [pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,1)] = λZpi(θ,1)(1−pi(θ,1))[h′(un)−h′(ua)]. (5)
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It is obvious that there are also three pairs of (λM,λAL) that may satisfy equation (5),
which are given as follows:
Case L1: λM = 0, λAH > 0
In this case, the moral hazard constraint of the low risk type is not binding, while the
adverse selection constraint of the high risk type is binding.
Case L2: λM > 0, λAH = 0
In this case, the moral hazard constraint of the low risk type is binding, but the adverse
selection constraint of the high risk type is not binding.
Case L3: λM > 0, λAH > 0
In this case, both the moral hazard constraint of the low risk type and the adverse
selection incentive constraint of the high risk type are binding.
Because the utility levels of the two types of agents, (un,ua) and (un,ua), are inter-
dependent in equilibrium, we need to take the first order conditions of both agents into
consideration in determining the optimal contracts. From equations (4) and (5), there are
nine possible combinations of those Lagrangian multipliers, which can lead to various po-
tential equilibria. The main findings of the investigation of all these cases are summarized
in the following propositions, and the proofs are provided in the Appendices.
Proposition 1. In a competitive reinsurance market with the simultaneous presence of ad-
verse selection and moral hazard, the Nash equilibria in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz,
when they exist, must be separating. In addition, there are several forms of equilibria:
• Pure Adverse Selection: both of the adverse selection constraints are binding, but
none of the moral hazard constraints is binding.
• Pure Moral Hazard: both of the moral hazard constraints are binding, but none of
the adverse selection constraint is binding.
• Strong Adverse Selection: both of the adverse selection constraints are binding, but
only the moral hazard constraint of the high risk type is binding.
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• Strong Moral Hazard: both of the moral hazard constraints are binding, but only the
adverse selection constraint of the high risk type is binding.
• Local Asymmetric Information: the adverse selection constraint and the moral haz-
ard constraint of the high risk type are binding, but none of the asymmetric informa-
tion constraints of the low risk type is binding.
Through the analysis of different equilibria, we can easily see how the simultaneous
presence of adverse selection and moral hazard affects the optimal contracts offered in the
case of either pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard. The following propositions
summarize these findings.
Proposition 2. In the simultaneous presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, the
moral hazard problem dominates in the sense that optimal contracts provide a reinsurance
coverage at most equal to the amount offered in the case of pure moral hazard, depending
on model structures. Moreover, a larger reinsurance coverage is offered to type θ at a
higher unit price. More specifically,
• pi(θ,1)> pi(θ,0): the optimal contract offered to type θ provides a reinsurance cov-
erage less than that in the case of pure moral hazard, while the optimal contract
offered to type θ provides a reinsurance coverage equal to or less than that in the
case of pure moral hazard.
• pi(θ,1)< pi(θ,0): the optimal contract offered to type θ provides a reinsurance cov-
erage equal to or less than that in the case of pure moral hazard, while the optimal
contract offered to type θ provides a reinsurance coverage equal to that in the case
of pure moral hazard.
Intuitively, when pi(θ,1)> pi(θ,0), the type θ agent is relatively riskier in the sense that
the probability of loss of type θ is higher if both types of agents expend the same level
of effort. However, if the type θ agent exerts effort while the type θ agent does not, the
20
latter then becomes the riskier one. This additional layer of adverse selection complicates
the principal’s job of contract designing even further and reduces the amount of coverage
offered to the type θ agent. When pi(θ,1) < pi(θ,0), the type θ agent is absolutely riskier
no matter whether the type θ agent expends effort or not. In this case, the highest possible
amount of coverage, which occurs at the intersection of type θ’s zero profit curve and its
moral hazard constraint line, is offered to the type θ agent.
Proposition 2 implies that, in the simultaneous presence of adverse selection and moral
hazard, no agent can obtain full insurance coverage. In addition, comparatively speaking,
the high risk agent will be offered a larger amount of insurance coverage at a higher unit
price, while the low risk agent will be offered a smaller amount of insurance coverage at a
lower unit price. These findings demonstrate that the positive correlation property between
insurance coverage and risk type of agents that is found in the pure adverse selection model
holds, even in the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Therefore,
we can exploit this positive correlation property to test for the existence of moral hazard
and adverse selection in reinsurance markets.
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4 Conclusions
Since the early seventies, the theoretical studies on contract theory have been explosive.
Various optimal contracts are designed to deal with different asymmetric information prob-
lems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard. However, the majority of the asymmetric
information literature treats the adverse selection and moral hazard problems separately. In
this paper, we consider a principal-agent model with the simultaneous presence of adverse
selection and moral hazard in a competitive environment. To resolve the non-concavity
issue in the optimization programming, we utilize the change-of-variable method proposed
by Laffont and Martimort (2002), and then apply the familiar Kuhn-Tucker method to solv-
ing the optimization programming.
By analyzing the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard, we find that
there are several forms of separating Nash equilibria. In addition, we find that, in our
framework, the moral hazard problem dominates in the sense that optimal contracts provide
reinsurance coverage at most equal to the amount offered in the case of pure moral hazard.
Furthermore, we find that the positive correlation property between insurance coverage
and risk type found in the pure adverse selection model still holds no matter what form of
separating Nash equilibrium it is.
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Appendix A: Proof in the Case of Pure Adverse Selection
Proof. Let λAH and λAL be the respective multipliers on the adverse selection incentive
constraints AH and AL, λZ be the multiplier on the zero-profit constraint, then the first
order conditions for this concave programming can be written as
∂L
∂un
= pi(θ,1)(1+λAH)−λALpi(θ,1)−λZpi(θ,1)h′(un) = 0,
and
∂L
∂ua
= (1−pi(θ,1))(1+λAH)−λAL(1−pi(θ,1))−λZ(1−pi(θ,1))h′(ua) = 0.
By eliminating λAH from the first order conditions, we can obtain that
−(pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,1))λAL = λZpi(θ,1)(1−pi(θ,1))(h′(un)−h′(ua))
Since 0 < pi(θ,1) < pi(θ,1) < 1, λZ > 0, h′ > 0, h′′ > 0, and un ≥ ua, we must have
λAL = 0 and un = ua. Therefore, agent θ is offered full insurance and h(un) = h(ua) =
w− (1−pi(θ,1))l.
Similarly, we can easily form type θ’s maximization program and obtain its first order
conditions. By eliminating λAL from the first order conditions, we can obtain that
(pi(θ,1)−pi(θ,1))λAH = λZpi(θ,1)(1−pi(θ,1))(h′(un)−h′(ua))
Since 0 < pi(θ,1)< pi(θ,1)< 1, λZ > 0, h′ > 0, h′′ > 0, and un ≥ ua, we can have two
possibilities: either λAH = 0 or λAH > 0. Notice that we have already derived that un = ua
and that the AL constraint is not binding. Now suppose that λAH = 0, then un = ua and
the AH constraint is not binding. Then we must have un = ua and un = ua. However, the
unbinding AH constraint implies that un > un, but the unbinding AL constraint implies
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that un > un, and then we have a contradiction. Hence, we must have λAH > 0. This
means that the AH constraint is binding, and un > ua. Therefore, agent θ is offered partial
insurance.
Appendix B: Proof in the Case of Pure Moral Hazard
Proof. Denoting by λM and λZ the respective multipliers on those two constraints, the first-
order conditions for this maximization problem can be written, respectively, as
pi(θ,1)+λM−λZpi(θ,1)h′(un) = 0
and
(1−pi(θ,1))−λM−λZ(1−pi(θ,1))h′(ua) = 0
Summing these two first order conditions yields
λZ =
1
pi(θ,1)h′(un)+(1−pi(θ,1))h′(ua)
> 0
.
Hence, the zero profit constraint is binding at the equilibrium contract as we claim.
Similarly, we can easily obtain that
λM = pi(θ,1)(1−pi(θ,1)) h
′(un)−h′(ua)
pi(θ,1)h′(un)+(1−pi(θ,1))h′(ua)
> 0
because of h′ > 0, h′′ > 0, and un > ua. Therefore, the moral hazard constraint is also bind-
ing at the equilibrium contract, which means that the marginal benefit of effort un− ua
equals to the marginal cost of effort ψ4pi(θ) . Therefore, the equilibrium contract is de-
termined by the two binding constraints. Since un− ua = ψ4pi(θ) , only partial insurance
is offered by reinsurance companies, which is implemented to mitigate the moral hazard
problem. Moreover, the higher the cost of exerting effort ψ4pi(θ) is, the greater the differ-
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ence between utilities in two states of world is, and thus the smaller amount of insurance is
offered.
Appendix C: Proofs in the Case of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that e= 1, that is, type θ exerts effort when she selects type θ’s
contract δ= {P, I}. In mathematical terms, it means that pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ≥
pi(θ,0)un+(1−pi(θ,0))ua, and this can be simplified as un−ua ≥ ψ4pi(θ) . Since 4pi(θ)<
4pi(θ) by assumption, we thus obtain that un−ua ≥ ψ4pi(θ) > ψ4pi(θ) .
Since h′′(·)> 0 and un > ua, we have h′(un)−h′(ua)> 0. In addition, since pi(θ,1)<
pi(θ,1) by assumption, and λAL ≥ 0 and λZ > 0 by definition, we can obtain from (3) that
λM > 0. This implies that, if e= 1, the moral hazard constraint of type θ is binding, and thus
we must have un−ua = ψ4pi(θ) , which contradicts the inequalities un−ua ≥
ψ
4pi(θ) >
ψ
4pi(θ)!
Therefore, the assumption that e = 1 is not true, and thus e = 0, and un− ua < ψ4pi(θ) .
Combining this with the two moral hazard constraints, we can easily obtain that ψ4pi(θ) ≤
un−ua < ψ4pi(θ) ≤ un−ua.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that λM > 0 and λAL > 0 hold simultaneously. It means that
both the moral hazard constraint and the adverse selection constraint of type θ are binding,
thus 
un−ua = ψ4pi(θ)
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ= pi(θ,0)un+(1−pi(θ,0))ua
The binding moral hazard constraint of type θ can also be written as
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ= pi(θ,0)un+(1−pi(θ,0))ua.
By joining the moral hazard constraint with the adverse selection constraint, we can
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obtain,
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
=pi(θ,0)un+(1−pi(θ,0))ua
=pi(θ,0)un+(1−pi(θ,0))ua.
These equations essentially imply that, in equilibrium if equilibrium exists, the optimal
contract offered to type θ is at the intersection of her moral hazard constraint and her
indifference line, while the optimal contract offered to type θ is at the intersection of his
indifference line V (e = 1) = pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ and type θ’s indifference line
V (e = 0) = pi(θ,0)un +(1−pi(θ,0))ua. Moreover, the indifference line V (e = 1) should
cross the indifference line V (e = 0) from above, otherwise type θ surely will select type
θ’s contract since it yields higher utility level to the type θ agent (i.e., type θ’s contract lies
above type θ’s indifference line).
A steeper indifference line V (e = 1) implies that 1−pi(θ,1)pi(θ,1) >
1−pi(θ,0)
pi(θ,0) , which can be
simplified as pi(θ,1) < pi(θ,0). pi(θ,1) < pi(θ,0) means that type θ is absolutely riskier
than type θ, regardless of effort level. In addition, when pi(θ,1) < pi(θ,0), the zero profit
curve of type θ at e= 0 is flatter than the zero profit curve of type θ at e= 1. In equilibrium,
the zero profit curve of type θ at e= 0 can not cross type θ agent’s indifference line V (e= 0)
(at most, to be tangent), otherwise a reinsurer can always offer another contract that shifts
the type θ agent’s indifference line rightwards and make a profit himself as well. Therefore
type θ’s zero profit curve does not cross the indifference line V (e = 0), because the zero
profit curve of type θ at e = 0 is flatter than the zero profit curve of type θ at e = 1 and
the former is at most tangent to the indifference line V (e = 0). Hence, there is no point
on the indifference line V (e = 0) that can be an optimal contract offered to the type θ
agent. This completes the proof that λM > 0 and λAL > 0 can not hold simultaneously in
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1. In the proof, we investigate every case in turn. When there is a
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Rothschild-Stiglitz Nash equilibrium, we will illustrate the equilibrium in a figure.
Case 1: (Case H1)+ (Case L1), that is, λM = 0, λAL > 0, λM = 0, and λAH > 0
In this case, the two moral hazard constraints are not binding, but the two adverse
selection incentive constraints are binding instead. Coupled with the two binding zero-
profit constraints, we now have four equations to solve for the four unknowns un, ua, un,
and ua: 
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ= pi(θ,0)un+(1−pi(θ,0))ua
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ= pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0
Unfortunately, it is difficult to analytically solve this system of equations without given
the specific functional forms of the zero profit constraints. But we can graphically demon-
strate some features of the contracts in equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 3, if there
are equilibrium contracts in this case. Since both of the adverse selection constraints
are binding, (un, ua) should be at the intersection of type θ’s indifference line V (e =
1) = pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ and type θ’s indifference line V (e = 0) = pi(θ,0)un+
(1− pi(θ,0))ua, while (un, ua) should be at the intersection of type θ’s indifference line
V (e = 1) = pi(θ,1)un + (1− pi(θ,1))ua −ψ and type θ’s indifference line V (e = 1) =
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ.
Furthermore, type θ’s zero profit curve pi(θ,1)(w− h(un))− (1− pi(θ,1))(−w+ l +
h(ua))= 0 should cross the intersection (un, ua), while type θ’s zero profit curve pi(θ,1)(w−
h(un))− (1− pi(θ,1))(−w+ l + h(ua)) = 0 should cross the intersection (un, ua). From
Figure 3, we can see that type θ’s indifference line V (e = 0) = pi(θ,0)un+(1−pi(θ,0))ua
crosses type θ’s indifference line from above, we must have pi(θ,0) < pi(θ,1) < pi(θ,1).
Otherwise, there is no intersection (un, ua), which implies that there is no separating equi-
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Figure 3: Case 1 of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
librium. Moreover, since both of the intersections, (un, ua) and (un, ua), are above its
respective moral hazard incentive constraint line, the amount of insurance offered to each
type is even less than that offered in the case of pure moral hazard.
Case 2: (Case H1)+ (Case L2), that is, λM = 0, λAL > 0, λM > 0, and λAH = 0
In this case, the moral hazard constraint and the adverse selection of type θ are not
binding, but those of type θ are binding. According to Lemma 2, there is no equilibrium in
this case.
Case 3: (Case H1)+ (Case L3), that is, λM = 0, λAL > 0, λM > 0, and λAH > 0
In this case, the moral hazard constraint and the adverse selection constraint of type θ
are binding. Again, according to Lemma 2, there is no equilibrium.
Case 4: (Case H2)+ (Case L1), that is, λM > 0, λAL = 0, λM = 0, and λAH > 0
In this case, the moral hazard constraint and adverse selection constraint of type θ are
binding, while none of the constraints of type θ is binding. Combined with the two binding
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zero profit constraints, we have four equations with four unknowns:

un−ua = ψ4pi(θ)
pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ= pi(θ,1)un+(1−pi(θ,1))ua−ψ
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0
Since type θ’s moral hazard constraint is not binding but the adverse selection constraint
of type θ is binding, (ua, un) should locate above its moral hazard constraint line and be the
intersection of indifference lines of the two types. As for (ua, un), since the moral hazard
constraint of type θ is binding, it is the intersection of its indifference line and moral hazard
constraint line. Meanwhile, (ua, un) should be to the left of type θ’s indifference line, since
the adverse selection constraint of the low risk type is not binding. Figure 4 illustrates the
set of constraints in equilibrium in this case. It is obviously that type θ is offered the same
contract as in the case of pure moral hazard, while type θ is offered even smaller amount
of insurance than that in the pure moral hazard case.
Case 5: (Case H2)+ (Case L2), that is, λM > 0, λAL = 0, λM > 0, and λAH = 0
In this case, both of the moral hazard constraints are binding, while none of the adverse
selection constraints is binding. The two binding moral hazard constraints and the binding
zero profit constraints give us a system of four equations with four unknowns:

un−ua = ψ4pi(θ)
un−ua = ψ4pi(θ)
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0
pi(θ,1)(w−h(un))− (1−pi(θ,1))(−w+ l+h(ua)) = 0
Since both of the moral hazard constraints are binding, (ua, un)and (ua, un) should be on
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Figure 4: Case 4 of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
its respective moral hazard constraint line, thus each agent is offered the same contract as
in the case of pure moral hazard. Moreover, since both of the adverse selection constraints
are not binding, the indifference line of high risk type must cross the indifference line of
low risk type from above, as illustrated in Figure 5. This implies that type θ is absolutely
riskier than type θ no matter whether the latter expends effort or not.
Case 6: (Case H2)+ (Case L3), that is, λM > 0, λAL = 0, λM > 0, and λAH > 0
In this case, both of the moral hazard constraints and type θ’s adverse selection con-
straint are binding, while type θ’s adverse selection constraint is not binding. Therefore,
similar to the previous case, each agent is offered the same contract as in the case of pure
moral hazard; the only difference between this case and the previous one is that type θ is
now indifferent between the two contracts offered, while he strictly prefers his own contract
in the previous case. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 6.
Case 7: (Case H3)+ (Case L1), that is, λM > 0, λAL > 0, λM = 0, and λAH > 0
In this case, both of the adverse selection constraints and type θ’s moral hazard con-
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Figure 5: Case 5 of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
straint are binding, but type θ’s moral hazard constraint is not binding. Similar to Case
4, type θ is offered the same contract as in the case of pure moral hazard, while type θ
is offered even smaller amount of insurance than that in the pure moral hazard case. One
major difference between this one and Case 4 is that type θ is now indifferent between the
two contracts offered, while she strictly prefers her own contract in the Case 4. Figure 7
demonstrates the equilibrium in this case.
Case 8: (Case H3)+ (Case L2), that is, λM > 0, λAL > 0, λM > 0, and λAH = 0
In this case, both of the moral hazard constraints and type θ’s adverse selection con-
straint are binding, but type θ’s adverse selection constraint is not binding. According to
Lemma 2, there is no equilibrium.
Case 9: (Case H3)+ (Case L3), that is, λM > 0, λAL > 0, λM > 0, and λAH > 0
In this case, all constraints are binding. According to Lemma 2, there is no equilibrium.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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Figure 6: Case 6 of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
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Figure 7: Case 7 of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
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Abstract
Over the past decade, due to unexpected huge insured losses in the wake of a se-
ries of catastrophic events, reinsurance markets are playing a more significant role in
insurance industry as evidenced by the dramatic increase in reinsurance premiums.
However, few studies have empirically investigated asymmetric information problems
in these markets. To bridge the gap, this paper tests for the existence of adverse se-
lection and moral hazard in reinsurance markets for the period 1995-2000, and finds
that (1) adverse selection is present in private passenger auto liability and homeowners
reinsurance market; (2) residual moral hazard is not present in the three largest lines
of reinsurance but present in reinsurance markets as a whole; and (3) moral hazard is
present in product liability reinsurance market, but not in the other two major lines of
reinsurance.
35
1 Introduction
After the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the theory
of contract grows dramatically over the past 30 years. In contrast, empirical studies on
contract theory, although they are catching up in the past decade, are left far behind. Due
to the nature of insurance industry, many insurance markets such as auto insurance, health
insurance, and life insurance, are the favorite subjects of these empirical studies. However,
reinsurance markets are largely ignored in the empirical asymmetric information literature,
even though reinsurance plays a significant role in insurance industry.
According to National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), in year 2006,
U.S. property-liability insurers have ceded insurance premiums worth 492 billion dollars,
which amounts to about 52 percent of their direct business written. The high cession rate
reflects a peculiar organizational structure in the reinsurance market. Insurance companies
are often affiliated with an insurance group, and many reinsurance transactions take place
within affiliates of insurance groups. In 2006, there are 3,091 property-liability insurers re-
porting to the NAIC, among which 2,136 insurers are affiliated with 428 insurance groups,
and 76 percent of reinsurance activities (by ceded premiums volume) go to affiliated mem-
ber insurers of an insurance group (later called internal reinsurance), while the rest take
place among unaffiliated insurance companies (later called external reinsurance).
Although the bulk of reinsurance activities occur within insurance groups, many pre-
vious studies on reinsurance markets either totally disregard internal reinsurance or treat
internal reinsurance solely as a corporate capital structure phenomenon (Powell and Som-
mer, 2007), and few studies place it in the framework of optimal risk sharing and analyze
the related incentive problems.1 Doherty and Smetters (2005) argue that, price incentives
are more effective in resolving agency conflicts between separate contracting parties where
asymmetric information problem is more severe, while monitoring is more efficient in con-
trolling agency conflicts within organization. However, monitoring within organizations
1Exceptions include Doherty and Smetters (2005), and Garven and Grace (2007).
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can still be expensive and is very unlikely to be perfect. Therefore, agency conflicts can-
not be completely internalized and eliminated within organizations, although the level of
information asymmetry may be reduced to some extent.
This study investigates the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance
market by examining internal and external reinsurance jointly. The different levels of in-
formation asymmetry for internal versus external reinsurance are exploited to test for the
existence of asymmetric information problems in this market.
In this empirical study, We first test for the existence of adverse selection by using ran-
dom effects Tobit model. We then test for the existence of both moral hazard and residual
moral hazard in a single GLS fixed effects model. To test for the presence of residual moral
hazard, we exploit a peculiar institutional feature in reinsurance markets, that is, the simul-
taneous presence of external and internal reinsurance markets. To our knowledge, this is
the first empirical test for the existence of residual moral hazard in reinsurance market.
As a preview of our empirical results, we find evidence of adverse selection in private
passenger auto liability reinsurance market, homeowners reinsurance market, and overall
reinsurance markets, but not in product liability reinsurance market. In addition, we find
indecisive evidence of residual moral hazard in homeowners reinsurance market and rein-
surance markets as a whole, but no evidence in private passenger auto liability reinsurance
market and product liability reinsurance market. Furthermore, we find some evidence of
moral hazard only in product liability reinsurance market, which is properly controlled by
reinsurers using retention limit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
empirical literature regarding asymmetric information problems. Section 3 presents data
description and variable development. Section 4 proposes strategies to test for adverse
selection and moral hazard in reinsurance markets and presents empirical results. Section
5 includes discussion of empirical tests and proposes robust checks. Section 6 presents
conclusions and implications of the paper.
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2 Literature Review
A standard prediction of contract theory is the positive correlation property: everything
being equal, people who face contracts with more comprehensive coverage should exhibit
higher accident probability. The majority of empirical studies in contract theory boil down
to test this positive correlation property. Therefore, if a sample data set demonstrates a
positive correlation between insurance coverage and accident occurrence, it is evidence of
the existence of asymmetric information. However, the positive correlation alone does not
give us too much insight into the nature of the underlying asymmetric information problem.
It is well argued in the literature that the positive correlation can be the result of adverse
selection, moral hazard, or even unobserved heterogeneous preference.
Under adverse selection, people are characterized by different levels of risk. High risk
people, knowing they are more likely to have an accident in the future, tend to purchase
contracts with more comprehensive coverage. However, in a context of moral hazard, peo-
ple first choose different contracts due to exogenous reasons, and then they are faced with
different incentive schemes; those who end up facing a contract with more comprehensive
coverage will have less incentive to adopt a more cautious behavior, which may result in
higher accident probability. In practice, although the distinction between adverse selection
and moral hazard may be crucial, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to separate them,
especially on cross-sectional data.
Until now, the empirical findings on the presence of adverse selection are far from
reaching a consensus. Dahlby (1983) tests for the presence of adverse selection in the
Canadian automobile insurance market, and he find evidence of adverse selection. By
comparing actual amount of health insurance purchased in the individual market with an
predicted amount purchased in the group market by low-risk families, Browne (1992) finds
evidence of adverse selection in the health insurance market.
Puelz and Snow (1994) use observations of claim-filing at the end of the contractual
period to measure individual risks. They find that high risk individuals choose the lowest
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deductible, and thus they claim the presence of adverse selection in the automobile collision
insurance market. However, Dionne, Gourie´roux and Vanasse (2001) argue that the finding
of adverse selection in Puelz and Snow (1994) is spurious and due to potential nonlinear
effects of observable risk classification variables. By including the expected number of
accidents in the regression model, they do not find evidence of adverse selection any longer.
Cardon and Hendel (2001) estimate a structural model of health insurance and health
care choices. They test for the unobservables linking health insurance status and health care
consumption, and find no evidence of adverse selection. By using data on U.K. annuity
markets, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) test relationships between ex post mortality and
annuity characteristics, such as the degree of back-loading and the possibility of payments
to the annuitant’s estate, and find evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection
in U.K. annuity markets. Garven and Grace (2007) empirically test some implications
of the adverse selection model on reinsurance developed in Jean-Baptiste and Santomero
(2000). More specifically, they test how long-term reinsurance contracting relationships
affect amount of reinsurance coverage, primary insurer’s profitability, and primary insurer’s
probability of bankruptcy. Their empirical findings are largely consistent with predictions
of the adverse selection model.
The lack of consensus among empirical studies on the adverse selection problem is
not unique at all, and it is a recurring theme in empirical studies on the moral hazard
problem as well. One major difficulty in testing for moral hazard is that effort is not directly
observable to outsiders such as reinsurance companies, courts, or researchers. To provide
convincing evidence in the empirical tests, various ingenious strategies are employed in
the literature. One common approach to testing for the presence of moral hazard is to
use experiments, natural experiments (Chiappori and Salanie, 2003) or other strategies to
establish a reference group, and the reference group is used as a benchmark for comparison
in testing for the existence of “residual” moral hazard among the rest of population.
By dividing the variation of total consumption of worker’s compensation insurance
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benefits with respect to changes in insurance coverage into two parts (the variation due
to a given level of asymmetric information, and the variation due to a greater level of
asymmetric information), Dionne and St-Michel (1991) find evidence of moral hazard in
Canadian workers’ compensation insurance market. Cummins and Tennyson (1996) use
survey data on consumer attitudes toward various types of dishonest behaviors related to
insurance claims as an indicator of moral hazard, and find strong evidence of moral hazard
in U.S. automobile insurance markets.
Chiappori, Durand and Geoffard (1998) use a subgroup of individuals facing no change
in co-payment rate in the French medical insurance markets as a control group, and inves-
tigate how an introduction of a co-payment rate affects the demand for physician services.
They find evidence of moral hazard in the French medical insurance markets. In the French
auto insurance markets for young drivers, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) find no evidence
of moral hazard , and they argue that the auto insurance markets for young drivers should
be absent from contamination of the adverse selection problem, which makes possible the
separation of moral hazard from adverse selection. Although both used data on French auto
insurance, Abbring, Pinquet and Chiappori (2003) find no evidence of moral hazard, while
Dionne, Michaud and Dahchour (2004) demonstrate the presence of moral hazard to the
contrary by jointly estimating a bivariate probit model with correlated errors.
Doherty and Smetters (2005) develop a two-period principal-agent model to study the
moral hazard problem in reinsurance markets. Then they test the empirical implications
of their model using panel data on homeowners reinsurance and product liability reinsur-
ance. They not only find evidence for the existence of moral hazard in these reinsurance
markets, but also identify the methods that reinsurers use to address the moral hazard prob-
lem across different types of business relationship. A more recent study (Barros, Machado
and Galdeano, 2007) estimated how extra health insurance coverage affected the demand
for health care services. By using matching estimators technique, they found presence of
moral hazard in certain types of health care but not in the others.
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In this paper, we contribute to the empirical literature on asymmetric information by
investigating the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the three largest prop-
erty/liability reinsurance markets in U.S., which are largely ignored in the previous empir-
ical studies. Ideally, we should test for the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
simultaneously, however, as it is well known in the literature, it is very difficult, if not im-
possible, to achieve that. Therefore, based on U.S. reinsurance market structure and the
characteristics of our data, we employ different empirical strategies to test for the presence
of adverse selection and moral hazard separately in the reinsurance markets.
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3 Data Description and Variable Development
3.1 Data Description
We mainly use two data sources: one is NAIC property and casualty annual statement
data sets, and the other is A.M. Best’s Key Rating Guide - Property/Casualty. NAIC data
sets contain detailed information on most American insurance companies, such as total
assets, premium written, organization form, group affiliation, reinsurance premium ceded,
reinsurance premium assumed, etc. A.M. Best’s Key Rating Guide - Property/Casualty
complements NAIC data set with data such as insurers’ financial strength ratings and lead
company. Data from year 1995 to 2000 are used, since the reinsurance markets are widely
viewed as soft markets during this period of time, and thus the markets are more close to
competitive markets. In addition, data from year 2001 to 2006 are collected as well to
construct a few key variables. The following three of the largest property/casualty lines of
reinsurance are used for our empirical tests: private passenger auto liability reinsurance,
homeowners reinsurance, and product liability reinsurance.
For the years 1995 to 2000, a total of 17,996 observations of insurance companies were
reported to the NAIC, among which 7,875 observations were reported to write positive
ceded reinsurance premiums in private passenger auto liability insurance, 7,636 observa-
tions in homeowners insurance, while 4,225 observations in product liability insurance. To
obtain appropriate sample for this study, we apply the following sample selection criteria:
1. The firm must report to be active and file its annual statement individually;
2. The firm must report positive numbers for direct written premiums, both for the entire
firm and for the line of business under study;
3. The firm’s policyholder surplus and total admitted assets must be greater than $250,000;
4. The firm must have been classified as a stock, mutual or reciprocal company;
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5. For individual line of business, the firm must not be classified as a reinsurer. Accord-
ing to the classification scheme used by A.M. Best, reinsurers are defined as “firms
whose reinsurance assumed from nonaffiliates is more than 75 percent of the direct
business written plus reinsurance assumed from affiliates” (Cole and McCullough,
2007). 2
The final sample on private passenger auto liability reinsurance includes 2121 affil-
iated insurer observations and 393 unaffiliated insurer observations for the period from
1995 through 2000. The final sample on homeowners reinsurance includes 1865 affiliated
insurer observations and 602 unaffiliated insurer observations for the period from 1995
through 2000. The final sample on product liability reinsurance includes 789 affiliated in-
surer observations and 39 unaffiliated insurer observations for the period from 1995 through
2000. To reduce the impact of outliers and data errors, some variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles.3
3.2 Variable Development
Based on prior studies on reinsurance and related topics, the following variables, which we
believe to be relevant for the purpose of the current study, are constructed for hypotheses
testing. Table 1 provides a summary of the definitions of all of the variables.
Net Amount of Reinsurance. The net amount of reinsurance is usually defined as the
ratio of reinsurance premiums ceded to the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance
premiums assumed.4 However, this definition may be not appropriate when we consider
internal and external reinsurance simultaneously, because internal reinsurance can be used
for other purposes except for the traditional risk transfer function. For instance, a leading
affiliated insurer of an insurance group may, due to its stronger financial status, assume
2It is also used by Powell and Sommer (2007).
3Refer to Cox (1998) for detailed discussion and Stata command on winsorizing. Garven and Grace
(2007) also apply winsorizing in their study on reinsurance.
4This definition is used by Berger, Cummins and Tennyson (1990), Mayer and Smith (1990), Garven
(1990), and Cole and McCullough (2006).
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reinsurance from other affiliates for the purpose of purchasing reinsurance from outside
reinsurers as a single entity, which may be more cost efficient or result in a stronger bar-
gaining power with outside reinsurers. However, after the purchase of external reinsurance,
the leading affiliate may allocate reinsurance back to the other affiliates. In this situation,
the net reinsurance purchased by a non-leading affiliate is the difference between the rein-
surance ceded to and assumed from the leading affiliate. To mitigate the problems associ-
ated with the utilization of internal reinsurance, we treat an affiliated insurer either as a net
buyer or a net seller of internal reinsurance. Therefore, we define net amount of reinsurance
as the ratio of the sum of external reinsurance premiums ceded and net internal reinsurance
ceded to the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance premiums assumed, or
net amount
of reinsurance
=
external ceded reinsurance + net internal ceded reinsurance
direct premiums written + external assumed
reinsurance + net internal assumed reinsurance
where net internal ceded reinsurance = internal ceded reinsurance - internal assumed rein-
surance.5
Loss Ratio Volatility / Future Loss Ratio Volatility. We estimate the standard deviation
of loss ratio for primary insurance companies using data from year t to year t+6. For
instance, the value for loss ratio volatility in year 1995 for a given insurance company is
computed using loss ratios of the years 1995-2001. Loss ratio volatility is commonly used
in the literature to measure the riskiness of an insurer (Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan, 1990;
Cummins, et al., 2008), and it is usually computed using historical data. However, loss
ratio volatility constructed in this way essentially contains only public information, and
thus is not appropriate for the purpose of current study. Hence, we believe that loss ratio
volatility should be computed using future data instead of historical data to capture any
potential asymmetric information between a primary insurer and a reinsurer.
Loss Reserve Error / Loss Forecast Revision. An alternative measure of riskiness of a
5Note here that, in the definition, either net internal ceded reinsurance or net internal assumed reinsurance
or both are equal to zero.
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primary insurer is loss reserve error.6 Loss reserve error in year t is the difference between
the actually developed incurred losses as of year t+5 and the originally reported incurred
losses in year t. A five-year development period is used since a high percentage of losses
is settled during this period. If an insurer has a positive loss reserve error, it implies that
the losses and loss adjustment expenses actually developed in the future is higher than
originally estimated by the insurer, and it is evidence of under-reserving. Comparing to
loss ratio volatility, loss reserve error should be a better measure of risk since it mainly
reflects the asymmetric information between a primary insurer and a reinsurer at the time
of contracting, while loss ratio volatility, by its nature, should be a noisier measure of
risk. To remove the effect of firm size, we use percentage error. The percentage error is
computed as the ratio of loss reserve error to the originally reported incurred losses.
Loss Ratio Difference. Alternatively, we gauge the riskiness of a primary insurer by
loss ratio difference, which is measured by the difference between an insurer’s loss ratio in
year t and the average of yearly industry loss ratio over the previous three years. Therefore,
this measure reflects an insurer’s relative riskiness comparing to the industry.
Loss Ratio Ceded. For each line of reinsurance business, loss ratio ceded is defined as
the ratio of total loss ceded7 to total premiums ceded. In order to estimate total loss ceded
more accurately, we use a five-year development period.
External Reinsurance Ratio. For each line of reinsurance business, external reinsurance
ratio is defined as the ratio of external ceded reinsurance to total ceded reinsurance.
Year Dummies. Year dummies are included to eliminate any industry-wide effect on the
risk measures of individual insurance companies.
Best’s Ratings. A.M. Best’s financial strength ratings are used to measure financial
strength of insurers. Four rating dummies are used. The rating dummy “Rating1” takes a
value of 1 if an insurer is assigned a rating of either A++ or A+, and zero elsewhere. The
rating dummy “Rating2” takes a value of 1 if an insurer is assigned a rating of either A or
6Harrington and Danzon (1994) called it loss forecast revision.
7Since insurers do not report loss ceded to affiliated and nonaffiliated insurers separately, the total loss
ceded is the total ceded loss of internal and external reinsurance.
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A-, and zero elsewhere. The rating dummy “Rating3” takes a value of 1 if an insurer is
assigned a rating of either B++ or B+, and zero elsewhere. The rating dummy “Rating4”
takes a value of 1 if an insurer is assigned a rating of either B or B-, and zero elsewhere. The
omitted group includes insurers with a rating of C++ or lower. In general, we hypothesize
that the higher the Best’s rating is, the smaller the amount of ceded reinsurance is, because
a financially strong primary insurer may have the luxury of retaining a larger proportion
of underwriting risks and thus purchase a smaller amount of reinsurance. However, since
insurers with a rating of either B+ or B are on the verge of being regarded as either secure
or vulnerable, they may be more prudent and thus purchase more reinsurance in the hope
of improving their ratings.
Organizational Form. An organizational form dummy called “Mutual” takes a value of
1 if an insurer is either a mutual or a reciprocal insurer, and 0 otherwise (that is, a stock
insurer).
Distribution System. Two distribution system dummies are included. The dummy “Di-
rect” takes a value of 1 if an insurer is a direct writer, and 0 otherwise. The dummy
“Agency” takes a value of 1 if an insurer uses an independent agency distribution system,
and 0 otherwise.
Firm Size. Warner (1977) finds evidence that bankruptcy costs were less than propor-
tional to firm size, or in other words, bankruptcy costs were relatively higher for small firms.
Mayers and Smith (1990) argue that firm size could affect insurance demand through a few
channels, such as expected bankruptcy costs and real-service efficiencies, both of which
imply that large firms should purchase proportionally smaller amount of reinsurance. In
addition, several studies use firm size as a measure of bankruptcy costs (Mayers and Smith,
1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Weiss and Chung, 2004), and find that firm size
negatively affects the purchase of reinsurance. Here, firm size is defined as the natural
logarithm of total admitted assets.
Leverage. Leverage is calculated as total net premiums written to policyholders’ sur-
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plus, and it measures the probability of bankruptcy of an insurer.
Line-of-Business Concentration. It is computed as the ratio of premiums written in
a specific line to total premiums written. If a certain line of business, say homeowners,
accounts for a large proportion of an insurer’s underwriting risks, it is likely that the insurer
tends to purchase more reinsurance in this line.
Premium Growth Rate. The growth rate of a firm’s business is measured as the percent-
age growth in direct premiums written. Rapid growth usually causes a drain on the primary
insurer’s surplus, and thus the rapidly growing insurer needs more reinsurance to provide
surplus relief. In addition, rapid growth may be the direct result of the primary insurer’s
aggressive underwriting strategies, which can generate more volatile loss ratio. In order to
stabilize its profitability, the rapidly growing insurer may purchase more reinsurance.
Tax Rate. The cedent’s effective tax rate is computed as 1− NItBT NIt , where NIt is the
after-tax net income in year t, and BTNIt is the before-tax net income in year t (Garven and
Grace, 2007).
Contract Sustainability. Lambert (1983) shows theoretically that long-term contracts
can be used to “diversify away some of the uncertainty surrounding the agent’s actions”,
and thus control the moral hazard problem. Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000) demon-
strate that long-term implicit contracts can mitigate the adverse selection problem and thus
lead to more complete reinsurance coverage. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed in-
formation on individual reinsurance contracts, thus we have to indirectly measure contract
sustainability. Following Garven and Grace (2007), we include two variables to measure
contract sustainability. The first proxy is called “SUSTAIN”, and is defined as the percent-
age of premiums ceded over a three-year period to external reinsurers which are present in
all three years. The second proxy is called “RHERF”, which is defined as the average of
yearly Herfindahl index of reinsurance premiums ceded over year t-2 to year t. It “measures
the degree to which the cedent tends to have ‘focus’ versus diffuse contractual relationships
with external reinsurers” (Garven and Grace, 2007).
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Herfindahl Indexes. Product Herfindahl measures the degree of product diversification
of an insurer. It equals 1 if an insurer underwrites insurance only in a single line, and
converges to zero as the lines of insurance business underwritten increases. Geographic
Herfindahl measures the degree of geographic diversification of an insurer’s business. It
equals 1 if an insurer underwrites insurance only in one state, and approaches zero as the
number of states an insurer operates in increases.
Long Tail. Long Tail measures the proportion of an insurer’s premiums written in long
tail lines. Following Phillips, Cummins and Allen (1998), long tail lines include Farmown-
ers Multiple Peril, Homeowners Multiple Peril, Commercial Multiple Peril, Ocean Marine,
Medical Malpractice, International, Reinsurance, Workers’ Compensation, Other Liability,
Products Liability, Aircraft, Boiler and Machinery, and Automobile Liability.
Profitability. Two financial ratios are used to measure profitability of an insurance com-
pany: return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The ROA is the ratio of net
income to total admitted assets and ROE is the ratio of net income to surplus.
Age. Age is measured by natural log of the number of years that an insurer has com-
menced insurance business at the time of data observation. The older an insurer is, the
better the insurer may be known by people inside insurance industry, and thus the less se-
vere the asymmetric information problem might be between the insurer and a reinsurer.
Therefore, age is used to capture this asymmetric information effect (Powell and Sommer,
2007).
Retention Limit. Retention limit is measured by the ratio of retained losses (that is,
the difference between total losses and ceded losses) to total losses. If the reinsurance
contract is an excess-of-loss contract, then this ratio measures the retention limit of the
reinsurance contract. If the reinsurance contract is a proportional contract, then this ratio
gauges a primary insurer’s share of loss. According to Global Reinsurance Market Report
2006,8 proportional reinsurance contracts account for almost twice as much premium as
non-proportional reinsurance contracts in lines of non-life reinsurance. Therefore, retention
8By International Association of Insurance Supervisors.
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limit defined above, to a great extent, measures a primary insurer’s share of loss. However,
loss experience of insurance companies can be very volatile over time, which causes this
measure of retention limit a noisy variable. Therefore, as an alternative, retention limit is
also estimated by the ratio of net premiums written (that is, the direct premiums written
plus reinsurance premiums assumed minus reinsurance premiums ceded) to total premium
written (that is, the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance premiums assumed).
Lagged retention limit is used to avoid a spurious correlation or endogeneity problem.
Experience Rating. Similar to Doherty and Smetters (2005), experience rating is mea-
sured by the ratio of lagged total premiums earned (assumed and direct business) to lagged
total losses incurred. Loss experience can provide useful information about the risk type of
a primary insurer, thus reinsurers can use experience rating technique to reduce the adverse
selection problem. Moreover, in a multi-period setting, experience rating can also mitigate
the moral hazard problem as long as past loss experience of a primary insurer is public
information and available to all reinsurers.
Lead Company. Lead company is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if an insurer
is the lead company of an insurance group, and 0 otherwise. Among an insurance group, a
lead insurer tends to be larger and financially stronger comparing to non-lead affiliates.
Coastal States. Due to exposures to hurricane risks, the homeowners insurance mar-
kets in the hurricane-prone states behave quite differently. The dummy variable Coastal
States takes a value of 1 if an insurer is domiciled in one of the following states, which
are called hurricane-prone states according to the Landscape of Natural Disasters of US-
ATODAY.com: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia, and 0 otherwise.
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4 Empirical Tests
4.1 Testing for Adverse Selection
The methodology to test for adverse selection is pretty standard in the literature. Essen-
tially, we run a regression of reinsurance coverage on a measure of primary insurers’ risk
level and other control variables. Although individual reinsurance contract information is
ideal for this type of empirical test, we only have aggregate reinsurance data at firm level,
and thus we use the amount of reinsurance purchased by a primary insurer to measure the
amount of reinsurance coverage. The measure of the risk level of individual primary insur-
ers is critical here. The measure of individual firm risk should “represent some asymmetric
information between the insurer and the insured in the sense that, at the date of contract
choice, the insured has more information than the insurer about his individual (residual)
risk during the contractual period” (Dionne, Gourie´roux and Vanasse, 1998).
Previous empirical studies use forward-looking data in the sense that it is not available
at the time of contracting to measure risk of individuals. For instance, Dionne, Gourie´roux
and Vanasse (1998), and Dionne, Gourie´roux and Vanasse (2001) use the expected number
of accidents or the ex post actual number of accidents to measure agents’ risk level in
automobile insurance markets, while Edelberg (2004) utilizes predicted probability of late
payments to gauge agents’ risk level in mortgage and automobile loan markets. In this
paper, in a similar fashion, we use forward-looking data to construct our risk measure,
which is called loss reserve error (Weiss, 1985), or loss forecast revision Harrington and
Danzon (1994). Loss reserve error is the difference between the actually developed losses
and loss adjustment expenses outstanding at a given valuation date and the losses and loss
adjustment expenses originally estimated and reported. If an insurer has a positive loss
reserve error, it implies that the losses and loss adjustment expenses actually developed in
the future are higher than originally estimated by the insurer, and it is evidence of under-
reserving.
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There are several hypotheses about under-reserving, such as intentional managerial
bias, unintentional over-optimism, unpredictable bad experience (Petroni, 1992), and in-
come smoothing (Weiss, 1985). By assuming that the total claim losses paid as an unbiased
estimate of the expectation of outstanding loss claim, Petroni (1992) finds evidence con-
sistent with the hypothesis that managers of financially weak insurers bias downward their
estimates of claim loss reserves relative to other insurers after controlling for exogenous
economic factors. In addition, she also rules out the explanations of unintentional over-
optimism of management and unpredictable bad experience. Hence, loss reserve error is a
good measure of risk in the context of testing for adverse selection, since this measure of
risk, according to the findings of Petroni (1992), does contain some asymmetric informa-
tion between a primary insurer and a reinsurer.
4.1.1 Empirical Framework
The regression model used to test for the existence of adverse selection can be expressed
as follows:
REINSit = α+β Riskit +∑γXit + εit ,
where,
REINS =
external ceded reinsurance + net internal ceded reinsurance
(direct premiums written + external assumed
reinsurance + net internal assumed reinsurance)
;
Risk = the measure of risk of a primary insurer, either the loss ratio
volatility or the loss reserve error;
and Xit Xit includes the following exogenous variables: two proxies for long-term reinsur-
ance contracting relationship (i.e., SUSTAIN and RHERF), firm size, line-of-business con-
centration, line-specific premium growth rate, firm premium growth rate, financial leverage,
net income tax rate, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, the proportion of premiums
written in long tail lines, return on assets, lead company, coastal states, and year dummies.
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In the above regression model, the dependent variable, net amount of reinsurance, takes
on the value zero with positive probability but is roughly continuous and bounded on [0,1].
For instance, of 2419 observations in the sample of private passenger auto liability rein-
surance, 262 observations take a value of 0; of 2211 observations in the sample of home-
owners reinsurance, 144 observations take on the value zero. Figures 8, 9, and 10 provide
the histograms of net amount of reinsurance for private passenger auto liability reinsur-
ance, homeowners reinsurance, and product liability reinsurance, respectively. Therefore,
the dependent variable, net amount of reinsurance, is a typical corner solution outcome,
which renders the coefficient estimates of generalized linear regression model inconsistent
(Wooldridge, 2001). Hence, a corner solution model, or Tobit model, should be employed
to deal with this kind of “censored” data. Moreover, in order to take advantage of our panel
data feature, we estimate a random-effects Tobit regression of the amount of reinsurance
purchased by primary insurers on a measure of individual firm risk and other exogenous
economic factors.9 If the coefficient on the measure of risk, loss reserve error, is positive
and significant, we find evidence for the existence of adverse selection.
Before we discuss the empirical results of Tobit model, we need to keep in mind that,
for the purpose of our empirical test for adverse selection, we only care about the sign and
significance level of the coefficient estimates, thus we will not report the partial effects of
every independent variable on the conditional expectations of the dependent variable.
4.1.2 Results on Adverse Selection
Table 3A, 3B and 3C contain the summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical
regression models for each line of business. As previously discussed, variables winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles are line-specific net amount of reinsurance, loss ratio volatil-
ity, loss reserve error, experience rating, retention limit, line-specific premiums growth rate,
9STATA command xttobit is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our data samples. Since uncon-
ditional fixed-effects Tobit estimates are biased, we employ random-effects Tobit model here. Please refer to
STATA manual for further discussion (http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?xttobit).
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firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl,
proportion of premiums written in long tail lines, and return on assets.
Table 4A, 4B and 4C report the random-effects Tobit regression results for the follow-
ing three lines of reinsurance, respectively: private passenger auto liability reinsurance,
homeowners reinsurance, and product liability reinsurance. Since there is a number of
observations containing missing values of SUSTAIN and RHERF, we run our regressions
with and without these two variables.10
Table 4A reports the regression results for the private passenger auto liability reinsur-
ance. The coefficient on our risk measure, loss reserve error, is positive and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level when SUSTAIN and RHERF are included, and statistically
significant at the 10 percent level when SUSTAIN and RHERF are excluded. The positive
correlation between our risk measure and the amount of reinsurance purchased conforms
to our hypothesis that high risk insurers tend to purchase a larger amount of reinsurance.
Therefore, we conclude that adverse selection is present in the private passenger auto lia-
bility reinsurance market.
The coefficient on experience rating is positive as hypothesized, but insignificant at
conventional significance levels. The coefficient on retention limit is always negative and
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that an insurer retaining a higher proportion
of direct business premiums purchases a smaller amount of reinsurance. This may imply
that reinsurers use retention limit to mitigate the adverse selection problem. firm premiums
growth rate is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in every econometric spec-
ification, suggesting that rapidly growing primary insurers utilize reinsurance to resolve
their growth-related problems, such as surplus drain and volatile profitability. However,
auto premiums growth rate is never significant, suggesting that reinsurance purchase deci-
sion is made at the firm level. The coefficient on auto concentration is positive but only
statistically significant at the 10 percent level when SUSTAIN and RHERF are included, in-
10Because SUSTAIN is defined as the percentage of premiums ceded over a three-year period to external
reinsurers which are present in all three years, the construction of this variable will reduce our sample size by
about 25 percent.
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dicating that an insurer tends to purchase more private passenger auto liability reinsurance
if the insurer’s business is highly concentrated in this line of business.
The coefficient on leverage is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in both
econometric specifications. Since leverage proxies for the probability of bankruptcy, a
negative and statistically significant coefficient on it implies that the higher the probability
of bankruptcy, the smaller amount of reinsurance purchased. This may be because rein-
surers are reluctant to provide reinsurance coverage to those financially weak insurers or
because higher reinsurance price charged by reinsurers to those financially weak insurers
dampens these insurers’ desire to purchase reinsurance coverage. The coefficient on firm
size is always negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that
larger primary insurers tend to purchase less private passenger auto liability reinsurance.
The two proxies for long-term contracting relationship, SUSTAIN and RHERF, are never
significant.
The coefficient on geographic Herfindahl is always negative, and statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level when SUSTAIN and RHERF are included, suggesting that a more
geographically diversified primary insurer tends to purchase a larger amount of reinsurance.
This finding is consistent with the real service hypothesis11 of Mayers and Smith (1990).
The coefficient on lead company is always negative, and statistically significant at the 1
percent level when SUSTAIN and RHERF are included, indicating that those financially
strong lead companies within an insurance group tend to purchase less private passenger
auto liability reinsurance. Other variables such as tax rate, long tail lines, product Herfind-
ahl, ROA, and year dummies are not statistically significant at conventional significance
levels.
Table 4B contains the regression results for homeowners reinsurance. The coefficient
on loss reserve error is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level when
SUSTAIN and RHERF are included, and statistically significant at the 10 percent level
11This hypothesis states that those small insurance companies that geographically diversified or that offer
insurance across many lines put a greater value on the set of services provided by reinsurance companies and
thus tend to purchase more reinsurance.
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when SUSTAIN and RHERF are excluded. Again, this positive correlation between our
risk measure and the net amount of reinsurance purchased suggests that adverse selection
exists in homeowners reinsurance markets.
The coefficient on experience rating is always positive and significant at the 5 percent
level, suggesting that a favorable loss experience in previous year helps a primary insurer to
secure better homeowners reinsurance coverage.12 As in the line of private passenger auto
liability reinsurance, the coefficient on retention limit is always negative and significant at
the 1 percent level, suggesting that an insurer retaining a higher proportion of direct busi-
ness premiums purchases a smaller amount of reinsurance. The two proxies for long-term
contracting relationship, SUSTAIN and RHERF, are not statistically significant. Therefore,
we conclude that adverse selection is present in the homeowners reinsurance market, and
reinsurers use experience rating and retention limit to mitigate the adverse selection prob-
lem.
Table 4C reports the regression results for product liability reinsurance. In both econo-
metric specifications, the risk measure, loss reserve error, is not statistically significant at
conventional significance levels, indicating that the adverse selection problem does not ex-
ist in product liability reinsurance market. retention limit is again negative and significant
at the 1 percent level in both econometric specifications. However, the coefficients on expe-
rience rating are not significant, though positive as hypothesized. Also, both SUSTAIN and
RHERF are not statistically significant at the conventional 5 percent level. Therefore, we
claim that we find no evidence for the existence of adverse selection in the product liability
reinsurance market.
In sum, we find evidence for the existence of adverse selection in private passenger
auto liability and homeowners reinsurance markets, but not in product liability reinsurance
market. In addition, retention limit is widely used in every reinsurance market to mitigate
the adverse selection problem, while experience rating is found to be important in con-
12Experience rating is defined as the ratio of lagged total premiums earned to lagged total losses incurred.
Thus, a larger number of Experience rating implies a better loss experience in the previous year.
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trolling the adverse selection problem only in homeowners reinsurance market. However,
long-term contracting relationship seems not important in mitigating adverse selection in
reinsurance markets.
4.2 Testing for Moral Hazard
As discussed previously, one major difficulty in testing for moral hazard is that an agent’s
action or effort is either unobservable to an outsider or too costly to observe. Therefore,
without a good measure of effort level, a direct test for moral hazard is infeasible. One
common approach to overcome this difficulty is to test for “residual” moral hazard. More
specifically, a population in question is divided into two or more groups based on some
exogenous criteria. If one group is believed to be more likely subject to the moral hazard
problem than another, the latter group is then used as a reference group and econometric
tests can be designed to test for this additional layer of moral hazard in the former group.
This approach has been used in a few previous empirical studies on moral hazard, such
as Dionne and St-Michel (1991), Chiappori, Durand and Geoffard (1998), Chiappori and
Salanie (2000), and Barros, Machado and Galdeano (2007).
To test for the existence of the residual moral hazard problem in reinsurance markets,
we use the approach described above by exploiting a peculiar feature in reinsurance mar-
kets. In insurance industry, many insurance companies are affiliated with various insurance
groups. Primary insurers affiliated with an insurance group can purchase reinsurance from
both affiliated member insurers and non-affiliated insurers, while non-affiliated insurers can
only purchase reinsurance from other independent insurance companies. To simplify ter-
minology, a reinsurance transaction between insurance companies affiliated with the same
insurance group is called internal reinsurance, while a reinsurance transaction between
non-affiliated insurance companies is called external reinsurance. As argued by Doherty
and Smetters (2005), price incentives should be more effective in mitigating agency con-
flicts between separate organizations, while monitoring should be more efficient to resolve
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agency conflicts within organizations where it is easier to have access to information. This
implies that it is more difficult for a non-affiliated reinsurer to monitor a ceding company
than an affiliated reinsurer does. Therefore, if the moral hazard problem exists in rein-
surance markets, it should be more severe in external reinsurance markets than in internal
reinsurance markets. Consequently, everything else equal, the loss experience of ceded
reinsurance should be worse for primary insurers using a higher proportion of external
reinsurance than for primary insurers using only internal reinsurance or a smaller propor-
tion of external reinsurance.
In addition, we construct two variables, experience rating and retention limit, to capture
any dynamics of the moral hazard problem. By exploiting the panel data feature of our
reinsurance data set, if we find that the loss experience of reinsurance in year t is positively
correlated with experience rating and/or retention limit in year t-1, then we find evidence
of moral hazard in that line of reinsurance.
In the following, we propose two empirical strategies to test the above hypothesis, the
first one is the matching estimators method, and the second one is the fixed effects model
for panel data.
4.2.1 Empirical Framework
A. Matching Estimators Method
Matching estimators technique is one of the recently developed semi-parametric approaches
used to estimate average treatment effects. Comparing to traditional regression analysis, matching
estimators technique does not make the linear functional form assumption, thus can overcome the
potential spurious correlation problem due to the omitted nonlinear effects (Dionne, Gourie´roux
and Vanasse, 2001). In our context, we apply matching estimators in order to estimate the impact of
having internal reinsurance coverage on the loss experience of ceded reinsurance. As discussed pre-
viously, an affiliated member of an insurance group can purchase reinsurance from other members
of the insurance group (called internal reinsurance) as well as independent reinsurers (call external
reinsurance), while an unaffiliated insurer can only purchase reinsurance from independent rein-
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surers. If the moral hazard problem is less severe within an insurance group due to easier access
to information, the loss experience of internal reinsurance should be more favorable than that of
external reinsurance, everything else equal.
More specifically, by taking group affiliation as the treatment variable, we can treat non-affiliated
insurance companies as the control group while affiliated insurance companies as the treatment
group. Furthermore, by taking Loss Ratio Ceded as the dependent variable, we can apply the match-
ing estimators technique to estimate the average differential of loss experience of ceded reinsurance
between these two groups. Denote by Yi(0) the outcome (i.e., loss ratio ceded in our context) ob-
tained by individual insurer i, i = 1, . . . ,N, if under the control group (i.e., unaffiliated insurers),
and Yi(1) the outcome individual insurer i would obtain if under the treatment group (i.e., affiliated
insurers). If both Yi(0) and Yi(1) were observable, the treatment effect on individual i would be sim-
ply computed as Yi(1)−Yi(0). In the same fashion, we could compute the treatment effect across
the full sample and then calculate the sample average treatment effect (SATE) as follows,
SAT E =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
{Yi(1)−Yi(0)}
If the estimated sample average treatment effect is negative and statistically significant at conven-
tional levels, it suggests that, on average, ceded reinsurance loss ratio of a primary insurer in the
treatment group (i.e., affiliated companies) is better than that of a similar insurer in the control
group (i.e., non-affiliated companies). Hence, we claim that residual moral hazard exists in the
reinsurance market.
However, only one of the two outcomes Yi(0) and Yi(1) is observed for individual i. Therefore, to
estimate the average treatment effect, we have to estimate the unobserved potential outcome for each
individual in the sample. If assignment to treatment is independent of the potential outcomes for
individuals with similar values of covariates Xi, we could use the average outcomes of some similar
individuals of the opposite treatment group to estimate the unobserved potential outcomes.13 This is
the main idea behind the matching estimators method. The independence assumption is reasonable
in our context because an insurer’s group affiliation, we believe, is exogenous to its loss experience
of ceded reinsurance. This belief is also supported by Cummins et al. (2008) as they argued that
13See Abadie and Imbens (2002) and Abadie et al. (2004) for detailed discussions.
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“ownership structure, group membership, distribution system and head office state are most of the
time once and for all decisions unaffected by the current situation of the firm... It is therefore very
unlikely that unobserved variables affecting reinsurance, risk management and financial intermedi-
ation would also affect these variables.”14
B. Fixed Effects Model on Panel Data
The regression model used to test for the existence of moral hazard can be expressed as follows:
Loss Ratio Cededit = α+β External Reinsurance Ratioit +∑γXit + εit ,
where,
Loss Ratio Ceded = Total Loss Ceded/Total Ceded Premiums Earned,
External Reinsurance Ratio = External Ceded Reinsurance/Total Ceded Reinsurance.
The vector of control variables X includes lag of loss ratio ceded, lag of retention limit, lag of expe-
rience rating, firm size, geographical concentration, line of business concentration, line of business
growth rate, firm growth rate, leverage, tax rate, SUSTAIN, RHERF, product Herfindahl, geographic
Herfindahl, proportion of premiums written in long tail lines, return on assets, lead company, coastal
states, and year dummies.
To take advantage of the panel data feature of our sample data, fixed effects model on panel
data15 is used to estimate the above regression model. Since the two proxies for long-term contract-
ing relationship, SUSTAIN and RHERF, reduce the number of observations significantly, we run the
above regression model on the sample data without and with these two variables.
If monitoring is more effective in mitigating asymmetric information problems within an insur-
ance group due to easier access to information, the loss experience of internal reinsurance should
14On pages 8-9 of Cummins et al. (2008).
15STATA command xtreg is used here to exploit the panel data features of our data samples. A Hausman
specification test is used to determine whether to employ a fixed effects model or a random effects model.
The specification test always indicates that the random effects model is not appropriate, and thus we employ
the fixed effects model. In addition, since we have only 3-4 years observations on average for each insurer,
clustering effect should not be of major concern according to Wooldridge (2001). Hence, we use White robust
standard error to control heterogeneity.
59
be more favorable than that of external reinsurance, everything else equal. Therefore, we hypoth-
esize that if the moral hazard problem is more severe in external reinsurance markets, or called as
the residual moral hazard in external reinsurance markets, the coefficient on External Reinsurance
Ratio should be positive and significant.
4.2.2 Results on Moral Hazard
Table 5A, 5B and 5C contain the summary statistics for private passenger auto liability reinsurance,
homeowners reinsurance, and product liability reinsurance, respectively. To mitigate the impact of
outliers and data errors, the following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles: loss
ratio ceded, amount of reinsurance for each line of business, experience rating, retention limit, line-
specific premiums growth rate, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, product Herfindahl,
geographic Herfindahl, proportion of premiums written in long tail lines, and return on assets.
A. Matching Estimators Method
As discussed previously, the dependent variable for the matching estimators method is loss ra-
tio ceded. The treatment variable is group affiliation, and affiliated insurers belong to the treatment
group while unaffiliated insurers belong to the control group. Independent matching variables in-
clude external reinsurance ratio, firm size, line-of-business concentration, line-of-business growth
rate, firm growth rate, leverage, tax rate, SUSTAIN, RHERF, lag of loss ratio ceded, retention limit,
experience rating, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, proportion of premiums written in
long tail lines, return on assets, and lead company. The STATA command nnmatch16 is used to
estimate the sample average treatment effect. By using simulations, Abadie and Imbens (2002) find
that four matches perform well in terms of mean-squared error, thus we choose four matches to esti-
mate the unobserved potential outcome for each individual in the sample. In addition, the matching
estimators are adjusted for bias caused by continuous matching variables and robust standard errors
are estimated to allow for heteroskedasticity.
Table 6A and 6B report the empirical results of the matching estimators method in the line of
16See Abadie et al. (2004) for detailed description of nnmatch procedure.
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private passenger auto liability reinsurance without and with SUSTAIN and RHERF, respectively.
The sample average treatment effects on both sample data sets are positive and significant at the
1 percent level, indicating that group affiliation increases the loss ratio of ceded reinsurance. This
implies that monitoring within an insurance group is not perfect and external reinsurers may use
other methods to effectively mitigate the moral hazard problem.
Table 7A and 7B contain the empirical results of the matching estimators method in the line of
homeowners reinsurance without and with SUSTAIN and RHERF, respectively. The sample average
treatment effect on the full sample is negative as hypothesized and statistically significant at the 1
percent level, while the sample average treatment effect on the sample with SUSTAIN and RHERF
is negative but not statistically significant, indicating that, on average, affiliated insurers have lower
ceded reinsurance loss ratio than non-affiliated insurers. This empirical finding suggests that resid-
ual moral hazard may exist in the homeowners reinsurance market, while long term contracting
relationship is effective in controlling the residual moral hazard problem.
In sum, the results from the matching estimators method suggest that the moral hazard problem
is no more severe in external reinsurance markets than in internal reinsurance markets in private
passenger auto liability reinsurance market, but may be so in homeowners reinsurance market.17
Hence, we find some evidence for the existence of residual moral hazard in homeowners reinsur-
ance market, but not in private passenger auto liability reinsurance market.
B. Fixed Effects Model on Panel Data
Table 8A reports the empirical results of the fixed effects model on panel data for private passen-
ger auto liability reinsurance. The coefficient on external reinsurance ratio is negative and insignifi-
cant no matter whether we include SUSTAIN and RHERF or not. This implies that monitoring is not
effective in reducing the moral hazard problem within an insurance group. This result is consistent
with our finding from the above matching estimators method. IN addition, the coefficients on the
lag of loss ratio ceded, retention limit, experience rating, SUSTAIN, and RHERF are not statistically
significant.
17We do not apply the matching estimators method on the sample of product liability reinsurance because
the data set includes only 39 unaffiliated insurers, which makes the matching estimators method highly unre-
liable.
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The coefficient on firm size is negative and significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that the
loss experience of ceded reinsurance is more favorable for larger insurers. The coefficient on auto
liability insurance concentration is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in both economet-
ric specifications, indicating that the more concentrated in auto liability insurance a primary insurer
is, the better the loss experience of auto liability reinsurance is. The coefficients on year dummies
are all negative and significant, suggesting that the loss experience of auto liability reinsurance are
more favorable comparing to that in year 2000. Moreover, the coefficients on year dummies de-
crease over the years in terms of absolute value, implying that the loss experience of auto liability
reinsurance deteriorates during this period.
However, one concern about the above regression model is that external reinsurance ratio may
be endogenous since it is constructed by using current year reinsurance premiums data. To resolve
this technical issue, we perform an exogeneity test proposed by Laffont and Matoussi (1995) on
external reinsurance ratio, and the strategy of the exogeneity test is laid out as follows: First, we
run a regression of loss ratio ceded on external reinsurance ratio and a vector of control variables
X1, which include lag of loss ratio ceded, lag of experience rating, lag of retention limit, SUSTAIN,
RHERF, firm size, auto liability insurance concentration, auto liability insurance premium growth
rate, firm premium growth rate, leverage, tax rate, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, pro-
portion of premiums written in long tail lines, return on assets, lead company, and year dummies.
Second, we run a regression of external reinsurance ratio on a vector of instruments Z and some
other control variables, where the instruments Z mainly include exogenous firm characteristics such
as mutual, direct, agency, age, and rating dummies. We save the residuals from the regression for
the next step.
Third, we rerun the regression model in the first step by including the residuals from the second
step as an additional independent variable. If the coefficient on the residuals is not statistically
different from zero, we can accept the exogeneity of external reinsurance ratio.
Table 8B, and 8C report the empirical results of the second and third steps of the exogeneity
test, respectively. Since the coefficient on residuals is never significant in Table 8C, we conclude
that external reinsurance ratio is exogenous in our regression model.
In conclusion, we find no evidence for the existence of residual moral hazard in the private
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passenger auto liability reinsurance market, which is consistent with our empirical findings by using
matching estimators method. In addition, we find that monitoring, experience rating, retention limit,
and long term contracting relationship are not influential on the loss experience of private passenger
auto liability reinsurance.
The empirical results of the fixed effects model on panel data for homeowners reinsurance ap-
pears in Table 9A. The coefficient on external reinsurance ratio is positive as expected but insignif-
icant in both econometric specifications, indicating that monitoring does not effectively mitigate
the moral hazard problem within an insurance group. The lag of loss ratio ceded is negative and
significant at the 1 percent level without or with SUSTAIN and RHERF, indicating the presence of
negative serial dependence in loss experience of ceded reinsurance in homeowners reinsurance mar-
ket. In addition, the coefficients on the lag of retention limit, and the long-term contracting proxies,
SUSTAIN and RHERF, are not statistically significant.
Recall that experience rating is defined as the ratio of total premiums earned to total losses in-
curred for direct and assumed business, which essentially is the inverse of loss ratio for direct and
assumed business. An increase in the lag of experience rating implies that an insurer’s loss expe-
rience is more favorable in the previous year. If this favorable loss experience in the previous year
justifies reinsurers to reduce current year’s reinsurance price based on experience rating practice, the
lower reinsurance price in current year will dull the primary insurer’s incentive to exert loss preven-
tion effort, which in turn causes the current year’s loss ratio of ceded reinsurance to rise. Therefore,
a positive and significant coefficient on the lag of experience rating should suggest the presence of
the moral hazard problem. However, we find that the coefficient on the lag of experience rating
is now negative and significant at the 10 percent level, which contradicts the hypothesis of moral
hazard.
Table 9B, and 9C contain the empirical results of the exogeneity test on external reinsurance
ratio in homeowners reinsurance. Since the coefficient on residuals in Table 9C is not statistically
significant, we conclude that external reinsurance ratio is exogenous in our regression model.
In conclusion, we find no evidence of residual moral hazard in homeowners reinsurance market
by using fixed effects model. Therefore, comparing to the empirical findings in matching estimators
method, we obtain contradicting results concerning the residual moral hazard problem in home-
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owners reinsurance market. Moreover, we find that loss experience of homeowners reinsurance are
negatively serially correlated.
Table 10A reports the empirical results of fixed effects model on panel data for product liabil-
ity reinsurance. The coefficient on external reinsurance ratio is positive as hypothesized but not
statistically significant at the conventional 5 percent level, indicating that the residual moral haz-
ard problem does not exist in product liability reinsurance market. The lag of loss ratio ceded is
positive and significant at the 5 percent level for the data sample without SUSTAIN and RHERF,
but statistically insignificant once we include SUSTAIN and RHERF. The coefficient on experience
rating is positive as hypothesized but statistically insignificant. The coefficients on SUSTAIN and
RHERF are not statistically significant as well.
The coefficient on the lag of retention limit is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in
both econometric specifications. Recall that retention limit measures a primary insurer’s share of
total loss incurred. A higher value of the lag of retention limit implies a larger proportion of total
loss retained by a primary insurer. An increase in the lag of a primary insurer’s share of total loss
may incentivize the insurer to expend more effort to prevent loss, and thus improve the insurer’s
loss experience in that year. The favorable loss experience in previous year may justify reinsurers to
reduce reinsurance price in current year, based on experience rating practice. The lower reinsurance
price in current year can reduce the primary insurer’s loss prevention effort, and eventually cause
an increase in loss ratio of ceded reinsurance in current year. Therefore, the positive and significant
coefficient on the lag of retention limit indicates the existence of the moral hazard problem.
Table 10B, and 10C report the empirical results of the exogeneity test on external reinsurance
ratio in the line of product liability reinsurance. Since the coefficient on the residuals in Table
10C is not statistically significant, we conclude that external reinsurance ratio is exogenous in our
regression model.
In sum, we find no evidence of residual moral hazard in the three largest lines of reinsurance.
However, we find some weak evidence for the existence of moral hazard in product liability reinsur-
ance market, which is properly controlled by the method of retention limit. In addition, we find that
loss experience are serially correlated in homeowners reinsurance and product liability reinsurance
markets.
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5 Discussion and Robust Tests
5.1 Robust Test of Adverse Selection
As we discuss earlier that the key is the construction of risk measure in the test of adverse selection.
Although we believe that loss reserve error is a good risk measure in our test of adverse selection,
we still construct two additional risk measures, future loss ratio volatility and loss ratio difference,
to test the hypothesis of adverse selection in reinsurance markets.
5.1.1 Future Loss Ratio Volatility as Risk Measure
The first alternative risk measure is volatility of loss ratio. This statistic has been used by Hoerger,
Sloan and Hassan (1990) and Cummins et al. (2008), but it is constructed using historical data.
However, it is unlikely that historical data contains any asymmetric information between a primary
insurer and an outsider such as a reinsurance company. In order to capture any asymmetric infor-
mation in this risk measure, we use data from year t to year t+6 to compute volatility of loss ratio
at year t, instead of using historical data. We then use volatility of loss ratio as our risk measure in
random-effects Tobit model to test for the existence of adverse selection in reinsurance markets.
Table 11A reports the Tobit coefficient estimates in the line of private passenger auto liability
reinsurance without and with the two proxies for long term contracting relationship, SUSTAIN and
RHERF, respectively. The coefficient on loss ratio volatility is always positive as hypothesized,
but not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. This may be because loss ratio
volatility so constructed is not a good risk measure that captures asymmetric information, or because
adverse selection does not exist in private passenger auto liability reinsurance market.
The coefficient on experience rating is not statistically significant at conventional significance
levels in every econometric specification, but positive as predicted. Retention limit is always nega-
tive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that an insurer retaining a higher
proportion of direct business premiums tends to purchase a smaller amount of reinsurance. The
coefficients on SUSTAIN and RHERF are not statistically significant.
Table 11B contains the empirical results of Tobit model in the line of homeowners reinsurance
without and with SUSTAIN and RHERF. The coefficient on loss ratio volatility is always positive
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as expected, but only statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the econometric specification
with SUSTAIN and RHERF. Therefore, we conclude that we find weak evidence of adverse selection
in the homeowners reinsurance market.
The coefficient on experience rating is always positive as expected and statistically significant
at the 5 percent level when we exclude SUSTAIN and RHERF, and is significant at the 1 percent
level when we include SUSTAIN and RHERF, suggesting that reinsurers employ the practice of
experience rating to mitigate the adverse selection problem. Retention limit is always negative as
predicted and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that retention limit is used to
reduce the adverse selection problem as well. In addition, the coefficients on SUSTAIN and RHERF
are never statistically significant.
Table 11C provides the Tobit coefficient estimates in the line of product liability reinsurance.
The coefficient on loss ratio volatility is not statistically significant in both econometric specifica-
tions. The coefficient on experience rating is positive but statistically insignificant in the economet-
ric specification without SUSTAIN and RHERF. However, once we include SUSTAIN and RHERF,
experience rating becomes negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The coeffi-
cient on retention limit is always negative as expected and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level in every econometric specification.
In sum, when we employ loss ratio volatility as the risk measure, we hardly find any evidence
for the existence of adverse selection in all the three largest lines of reinsurance. In addition, we find
that retention limit is widely used by reinsurers to mitigate any potential adverse selection problem
while the practice of experience rating is used in homeowners insurance market.
5.1.2 Loss Ratio Difference as Risk Measure
The second alternative risk measure is loss ratio difference. As we discuss earlier, loss ratio dif-
ference is measured by the difference between an insurer’s loss ratio in year t and the average of
yearly industry loss ratio over the previous three years. Therefore, this measure captures an insurer’s
relative riskiness comparing to the industry.
Table 12A reports the Tobit coefficient estimates using data on private passenger auto liability
reinsurance without and with SUSTAIN and RHERF, respectively. The coefficient on loss ratio
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difference is always positive but not statistically significant. Experience rating is always positive but
not statistically significant at conventional significance levels in every econometric specification. In
addition, the coefficient on retention limit is always negative and statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
Table 12B contains the empirical results of Tobit model in the line of homeowners reinsurance
without and with SUSTAIN and RHERF. When we do not include SUSTAIN and RHERF, the coef-
ficient on loss ratio difference is positive as expected and statistically significant at the 10 percent
level; however, with SUSTAIN and RHERF, loss ratio difference becomes significant at the 5 per-
cent level. Therefore, we conclude that we find some evidence of adverse selection in homeowners
reinsurance market. In addition, experience rating is always positive as expected and statistically
significant at the 5 percent level, and retention limit is always negative as predicted and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 12C provides the Tobit coefficient estimates in the line of product liability reinsurance.
The coefficient on loss ratio difference is positive as predicted but not statistically significant in
both econometric specifications. The coefficient on experience rating is positive but statistically
insignificant in every econometric specification. The coefficient on retention limit is always negative
as expected and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
In conclusion, when we use loss ratio difference as the risk measure, we find some evidence for
the existence of adverse selection in homeowners reinsurance market, but not in private passenger
auto liability and product liability reinsurance markets. Moreover, we find that reinsurers tend to
use retention limit to mitigate any potential adverse selection problem.
5.2 Empirical Tests on Firm-Level Reinsurance
Following Doherty and Smetters (2005), we use data on individual lines of reinsurance to test the
existence of asymmetric information. However, from the perspective of an insurer, reinsurance
purchase decision is made at the corporate level instead of at the level of individual line, since
the loss experience of many lines of insurance are correlated to some extent. For example, if an
insurer’s portfolio of insurance business consists of life insurance and annuity of similar proportion,
the insurer may not have much incentive to purchase reinsurance for each individual line, since the
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business of life insurance and annuity forms a “natural hedge” against each other. Therefore, as a
robust check, we also test for the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard using firm level
data.
Table 13A contains the summary statistics for the variables used in the test for adverse selec-
tion for all lines of reinsurance. As previously discussed, variables winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles are net amount of reinsurance, loss ratio volatility, loss reserve error, experience rat-
ing, retention limit, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, product Herfindahl, geographic
Herfindahl, proportion of premiums written in long tail lines, and return on assets.
Table 13B reports the empirical results for all lines of reinsurance using loss reserve error as
the risk measure of individual insurers. The coefficient on loss reserve error is always positive
as hypothesized and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating the existence of ad-
verse selection in overall reinsurance markets. The coefficient on experience rating is positive as
hypothesized and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that primary insurers purchase more
reinsurance if the loss experience in previous year is favorable. The coefficient on retention limit
is always negative as hypothesized and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that an insurer
retaining a higher proportion of direct business premiums purchases a smaller amount of reinsur-
ance. This may imply that reinsurers use retention limit to mitigate the adverse selection problem.
However, the coefficients on RHERFand SUSTAIN are not significant.
Table 13C provides the Tobit coefficient estimates using loss ratio volatility as the risk measure.
The coefficient on loss ratio volatility is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting
the existence of adverse selection in overall reinsurance markets. In addition, the coefficient on
experience rating is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, while the coefficient on retention
limit is always negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 13D contains the Tobit coefficient estimates using loss ratio difference as the risk measure.
The coefficient on loss ratio difference is positive as hypothesized and significant at the 1 percent
level, indicating the existence of adverse selection in overall reinsurance markets. In addition, as
predicted, the coefficient on experience rating is positive while the coefficient on retention limit is
always negative, and both of them are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in every econo-
metric specification, suggesting that reinsurers use the practices of experience rating and retention
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limit to control the adverse selection problem in reinsurance markets.
In summary, we find strong evidence of adverse selection in overall reinsurance markets, no
matter which risk measure we employ in our empirical test. Moreover, consistent with our findings
in the three largest individual lines of reinsurance, experience rating and retention limit are used in
mitigating any potential adverse selection problem in overall reinsurance markets.
Table 14A provides the summary statistics for all lines of reinsurance. Again, the following
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles: loss ratio ceded, amount of reinsurance for
each line of business, experience rating, retention limit, line-specific premiums growth rate, firm
premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, proportion of
premiums written in long tail lines, and return on assets.
Table 14B reports the sample average treatment effect estimated by the matching estimators
method for firm-level reinsurance without and with SUSTAIN and RHERF, respectively. The sample
average treatment effect on both sample data sets are positive but not statistically significant at the
conventional 5 percent level, indicating that group affiliation tends to increase the loss ratio of ceded
reinsurance. This suggests that monitoring within an insurance group is not effective in mitigating
asymmetric information problems.
Table 14C, 14D and 14E provide the empirical results of the three-step regressions of the ex-
ogeneity test, respectively. The coefficient on residuals in Table 14E is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level for the data sample with SUSTAIN and RHERF, indicating that external reinsur-
ance ratio is not exogenous in the fixed effects GLS regression. Therefore, we run two stage least
squares (2SLS) on panel data with bootstrap standard errors. 18 The endogenous variable external
reinsurance ratio is instrumented by exogenous firm characteristics such as mutual, direct, agency,
age, and rating dummies.
Table 14F contains the empirical results of the 2SLS regressions. The coefficient on external
reinsurance ratio is positive and significant at the 5 percent level for the data sample with SUS-
TAIN and RHERF. Recall that external reinsurance ratio is defined as the ratio of external ceded
reinsurance to total ceded reinsurance. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on external
reinsurance ratio indicates that the loss experience of ceded reinsurance is worse for primary insur-
18STATA command xtivreg is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our data samples.
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ers using a higher proportion of external reinsurance than for those using only internal reinsurance
or a smaller proportion of external reinsurance, which is evidence of residual moral hazard. The
coefficient on SUSTAIN is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting
that long term contracting relationship and loss experience of reinsurance are negatively correlated.
Moreover, the coefficients on the lag of loss ratio ceded, experience rating, retention limit, and
RHERF are not statistically significant.
Therefore, we find some evidence of residual moral hazard in overall reinsurance markets, but
we do not find any evidence indicating that experience rating and retention limit are effective in
mitigating the moral hazard problem in overall reinsurance markets.
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6 Conclusions
In this study, we use NAIC data and A.M.Best’s Key Rating Guide for the years 1995 to 2000 to em-
pirically investigate the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard in three lines of reinsurance:
private passenger auto liability reinsurance, homeowners reinsurance, and product liability reinsur-
ance. Due to the empirical difficulty in testing for the existence of adverse selection and moral
hazard simultaneously, we test for the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard separately in
the reinsurance markets.
In order to test the existence of adverse selection, we construct three measures of risk for indi-
vidual insurers. The first risk measure is loss reserve error, which is our favored measure of risk in
the test of adverse selection; the second measure of risk is loss ratio volatility; and the third measure
of risk is called loss ratio difference. By employing random-effects Tobit model on panel data, we
empirically investigate the validity of the positive correlation property between amount of reinsur-
ance coverage and the constructed risk measures by using two data samples. We find evidence of
adverse selection in private passenger auto liability reinsurance market, homeowners reinsurance
market, and overall reinsurance markets, but no evidence of adverse selection in product liability
reinsurance market. In addition, we find that experience rating and retention limit are widely used
by reinsurers to mitigate the adverse selection problem.
To investigate the existence of the residual moral hazard problem in the reinsurance markets, we
design two empirical tests. The first one is the matching estimators method. The basic idea behind
this test is that the loss ratio of ceded reinsurance should be lower on average for affiliated insurers
than for unaffiliated ones if the moral hazard problem is less severe within an insurance group due to
easier access to information. Our empirical findings from the matching estimators method suggest
that the residual moral hazard problem exists in homeowners reinsurance market, but not in private
passenger auto liability reinsurance market and overall reinsurance markets. The second empirical
test for residual moral hazard is the fixed effects model on panel data. Using this empirical test, we
find no evidence of residual moral hazard in the three largest lines of reinsurance. However, we do
find evidence of residual moral hazard problem in overall reinsurance markets by employing two
stage least squares method. The contradicting findings from the two empirical tests prevent us from
drawing a decisive conclusion on the existence of residual moral hazard in homeowners reinsurance
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market, but we are quite confident to claim that the residual moral hazard problem does not exist in
private passenger auto liability and product liability reinsurance markets. However, we find some
evidence for the existence of residual moral hazard in overall reinsurance markets. In addition, we
find some evidence that reinsurers use retention limit to mitigate any potential moral hazard problem
in product liability reinsurance market.
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Variable
Prediction
in Adverse
Selection
Prediction
in Moral
Hazard
Definition
External Reinsurance N/A N/A premiums ceded to non-affiliates, line-specific
Internal Reinsurance N/A N/A premiums ceded to affiliates, line-specific
Net Amount of Reinsurance N/A N/A (external reinsurance + net internal reinsurance) / total premiums
written; alternatively,  (external reinsurance + internal
reinsurance) / total premiums written; line-specific
External Reinsurance Ratio N/A + external reinsurance / (external reinsurance + net internal
reinsurance); alternatively, external reinsurance / (external
reinsurance + internal reinsurance); line-specific
Loss Ratio Ceded N/A N/A total loss ceded / total premiums ceded, line-specific
Loss Reserve Error + N/A (losses as actually developed as of  year t+5 - originally reported
incurred losses in year t) / originally reported incurred losses in
year t, line-specific
Loss Ratio Volatility + N/A loss ratio using data from year t to t+6, line-specific
Loss Ratio Difference + N/A difference between an insurer's loss ratio in year t and the average
of yearly industry loss ratio over previous three years
Experience Rating + + total premiums earned  / total losses incurred, line-specific
Retention Limit – + retained losses / total losses incurred; alternatively, net premiums
written / total premiums written; line-specific
Sustain + ± precentage of premiums ceded over a 3-year period to external
reinsurers which are present in all three years, firm-specific
Rherf ± ± average of yearly Herfindahl indeces of reinsurance premiums
ceded over year t-2 to year t, firm-specific
Firm Size natural logarithm of total admitted assets, firm-specific
Line-of-Business
     Concentration
Premium Growth Rate (premiums written in year t-1 / premiums written in year t) - 1
premiums written in a certain line / total premiums written of the
insurer
Table 1: Variable definitions
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Variable
Prediction
in Adverse
Selection
Prediction
in Moral
Hazard
Definition
Leverage total net premiums written / policyholder's surplus, firm-specific
Tax Rate 1 - (after-tax net income / before-tax net income)
Long Tail Lines proportion of an insurer's premiums written in long tail lines
Product Herfindahl a Herfindahl index of premiums written in different lines
Geographic Herfindahl a Herfindahl index of premiums written in different states
Return on Assets (ROA) net income in year t / total admitted assets in year t
Lead Company dummy variable equal to one if the insurer is a lead company of
an insurance group
Coastal States dummy variable equal to one if the insurer is domiciled in a
hurricane-prone state
Mutual dummy variable equal to one if the insurer is a mutual company
Direct dummy variable equal to one if the insurer is a direct writer
Agency dummy variable equal to one if the insurer uses independent
agency distribution system
Age natural logarithm of the insurer's age as of year t
Rating1 dummy variable equal to one if the A.M Best's financial strength
rating of the insurer is either A++ or A+
Rating2 dummy variable equal to one if the A.M Best's financial strength
rating of the insurer is either A or A-
Rating3 dummy variable equal to one if the A.M Best's financial strength
rating of the insurer is either B++ or B+
Rating4 dummy variable equal to one if the A.M Best's financial strength
rating of the insurer is either B or B-
Table 1: Variable definitions (continued)
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Line of Business Existence of Adverse Selectiona ? Existence of Residual Moral Hazardb ? Existence of Moral Hazardc ?
Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance Yes No No
Homeowners Reinsurance Yes Inconclusive d No
Product Liability Reinsurance No No Yes
All-Line Reinsurance Yes No No
d The matching estimators method finds evidence of residual moral hazard in homeowners reinsurance market, but the fixed effects model does not.
Table 2: Summary of Empirical Findings in Tests of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
a If the coefficients on the risk measures (loss reserve error , loss ratio volatility  and loss ratio difference)  are positive and significant  in the regression of net
amount of reinsurance, we find evidence of adverse selection.
b If the coefficient on external reinsurance ratio  is positive and significant in the regression of loss ratio ceded , or the sample average treatment effect  (SATE)
is negative and significant in the matching estimators mothod, we find evidence of residual moral hazard.
c If the coefficients on experience rating  and retention limit  are positive and significant in the regression of loss ratio ceded , we find evidence of moral hazard.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Auto Liability Reinsurance 2420 0.230 0.291 0 0.956
Loss reserve error 2420 -0.001 0.290 -0.810 1.444
Loss ratio volatility 2420 0.097 0.109 0.020 0.837
Loss ratio difference 2420 0.030 0.149 -0.296 0.667
Sustain 1958 0.726 0.331 0 1
Rherf 1958 0.443 0.310 0.026 1
Experience Ratingt-1 2420 1.239 0.209 0.687 1.944
Retention Limitt-1 2420 0.670 0.299 0.043 1
Firm size 2420 19.048 1.758 15.128 25.107
Auto Liab. Concentration 2420 0.317 0.206 0 0.987
Auto premium growth rate 2420 0.024 0.319 -0.798 1.710
Firm premium growth rate 2420 0.066 0.197 -0.394 1.078
Leverage 2420 1.501 0.768 0.205 4.267
Tax rate 2420 0.245 0.754 -4.779 3.041
Long Tail Lines 2420 0.707 0.130 0.190 0.973
Product Herfindahl 2420 0.332 0.150 0.120 0.762
Geographic Herfindahl 2420 0.502 0.366 0.043 1
ROA 2420 0.027 0.034 -0.100 0.120
Lead Company 2420 0.450 0.498 0 1
Year 2420 1997.574 1.702 1995 2000
Table 3A: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance for Adverse Selection Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles: auto liability reinsurance, loss reserve error,
loss ratio volatility, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, auto liability premiums growth rate, firm premiums
growth rate, leverage, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, long tail lines, and tax rate.
79
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Homeowners Reinsurance 2211 0.291 0.283 0 0.967
Loss reserve error 2205 0.037 0.357 -0.723 2.301
Loss ratio volatility 2211 0.191 0.219 0.037 1.619
Loss ratio difference 2211 -0.015 0.249 -0.712 0.995
Sustain 1812 0.761 0.305 0 1
Rherf 1812 0.425 0.312 0.018 1
Experience Ratingt-1 2211 1.384 0.475 0.573 3.759
Retention Limitt-1 2211 0.627 0.283 0.029 0.999
Firm size 2211 18.840 1.933 13.623 24.358
Homeowners Concentration 2211 0.206 0.183 0 0.966
Ho. premium growth rate 2211 0.082 0.210 -0.396 1.301
Firm premium growth rate 2211 0.057 0.158 -0.331 0.927
Leverage 2211 1.303 0.661 0.073 2.945
Tax rate 2211 0.272 0.644 -3.114 3.480
Long Tail Lines 2211 0.739 0.148 0.137 0.979
Product Herfindahl 2211 0.302 0.135 0.119 0.798
Geographic Herfindahl 2211 0.529 0.374 0.044 1
ROA 2211 0.026 0.032 -0.084 0.108
Lead Company 2211 0.542 0.498 0 1
Coastal States 2211 0.478 0.500 0 1
Year 2211 1997.620 1.690 1995 2000
Table 3B: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Homeowners Reinsurance  for Adverse Selection Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles: homeowners reinsurance, loss reserve error,
loss ratio volatility, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, homeowners premiums growth rate, firm premiums
growth rate, leverage, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, long tail lines, and tax rate.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Product Liability Reinsurance 638 0.249 0.293 0.000 0.979
Loss reserve error 638 0.793 2.987 -0.981 23.261
Loss ratio volatility 638 0.230 0.198 0.031 1.289
Loss ratio difference 638 -0.090 0.487 -0.864 2.017
Sustain 492 0.810 0.252 0 1.000
Rherf 492 0.273 0.225 0.026 1.000
Experience Ratingt-1 638 1.931 1.941 0.246 13.278
Retention Limitt-1 638 0.614 0.279 0.031 1.000
Firm size 638 19.984 1.478 16.411 24.379
Prod. Liab. Concentration 638 0.025 0.051 0.000 1.000
Prod. premium growth rate 638 0.174 0.832 -0.697 5.771
Firm premium growth rate 638 0.074 0.191 -0.256 1.151
Leverage 638 1.170 0.556 0.128 2.647
Tax rate 638 0.200 0.941 -5.972 2.981
Long Tail Lines 638 0.770 0.130 0.335 1
Product Herfindahl 638 0.247 0.125 0.108 0.849
Geographic Herfindahl 638 0.244 0.240 0.035 1
ROA 638 0.027 0.028 -0.059 0.123
Lead Company 638 0.398 0.490 0 1
Year 638 1997.577 1.731 1995 2000
Table 3C: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Product Liability Reinsurance  for Adverse Selection Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles: product liability reinsurance, loss reserve
error, loss ratio volatility, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, product liability premiums growth rate, firm
premiums growth rate, leverage, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, long tail lines, and tax rate.
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Figure 8: Histogram of Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance
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Figure 9: Histogram of Homeowners Reinsurance
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Figure 10: Histogram of Product Liability Reinsurance
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Figure 11: Histogram of All-Line Reinsurance
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.677    7.42*** 1.258    6.26***
Loss reserve error 0.064    2.62*** 0.040    1.84*
Sustain -0.007   -0.53
Rherf 0.000    0.01
Experience Ratingt-1 0.013    0.45 0.029    1.09
Retention Limitt-1 -0.326   -7.14*** -0.358   -7.14***
Firm size -0.053   -6.94*** -0.038   -5.57***
Auto Concentration 0.287    1.95* 0.087    1.20
Auto premium growth rate 0.006    0.22 -0.012   -0.49
Firm premium growth rate 0.114    3.39*** 0.125    2.61***
Leverage -0.074   -5.95*** -0.067   -5.98***
Tax rate 0.003    0.67 0.002    0.31
Long Tail Lines -0.037   -0.28 0.030    0.23
Product Herfindahl -0.165   -1.05 0.005    0.04
Geographic Herfindahl -0.147   -3.45*** -0.044   -1.32
ROA 0.271    1.77* 0.103    0.68
Lead Company -0.068   -2.62*** -0.039   -1.33
year1995 0.011    0.75 0.022    1.58
year1996 -0.005   -0.34 0.010    0.83
year1997 -0.018   -1.14 -0.008   -0.72
year1998 -0.013   -0.91 -0.012   -1.24
year1999 -0.018   -1.83* -0.015   -1.97**
N
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
2419 (262 observations left-censored
at 0, and 2157 uncensored)
1957 (110 observations left-censored
at 0, and 1857 uncensored)
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
Table 4A: Test for Adverse Selection - Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
Dependent Variable: net amount of private passenger auto liability reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss reserve error
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.343    8.40*** 1.001    5.86***
Loss reserve error 0.053    2.36** 0.031    1.78*
Sustain -0.007   -0.48
Rherf 0.026    0.84
Experience Ratingt-1 0.017    2.25** 0.022    2.42**
Retention Limitt-1 -0.193   -6.23*** -0.213   -6.22***
Firm size -0.038   -5.68*** -0.023   -3.29***
Homeowners Concentration -0.017   -0.23 -0.044   -0.63
Ho. premium growth rate 0.001    0.05 -0.026   -0.70
Firm premium growth rate 0.086    2.84*** 0.152    3.12***
Leverage -0.068   -4.72*** -0.062   -4.23***
Tax rate -0.002   -0.33 0.001    0.33
Long Tail Lines 0.007    0.10 -0.049   -0.53
Product Herfindahl -0.186   -2.05** -0.118   -1.27
Geographic Herfindahl -0.067   -2.09** -0.008   -0.20
ROA 0.258    2.40** 0.177    1.59
Lead Company -0.111   -4.75*** -0.076   -2.87***
Coastal States 0.015    0.78 0.035    2.23**
year1995 0.014    1.18 0.023    2.22**
year1996 0.010    1.02 0.013    1.42
year1997 0.005    0.51 0.017    2.05**
year1998 -0.006   -0.61 0.000    0.02
year1999 -0.009   -1.08 -0.006   -0.80
N
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
2202 (144 observations left-censored
at 0, and 2058 uncensored)
1803 (46 observations left-censored
at 0, and 1757 uncensored)
Table 4B: Test for Adverse Selection - Homeowners Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
Dependent Variable: net amount of homeowners reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss reserve error
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.418    3.02*** 1.669    3.48***
Loss reserve error 0.006    1.15 -0.001   -0.23
Sustain -0.041   -1.12
Rherf -0.100   -1.92*
Experience Ratingt-1 0.002    0.38 0.001    0.22
Retention Limitt-1 -0.346   -3.53*** -0.347   -3.82***
Firm size -0.040   -1.86* -0.046   -2.30**
Prod. Liab. Concentration 0.473    0.84 0.396    0.40
Prod. premium growth rate 0.003    0.26 -0.005   -0.59
Firm premium growth rate 0.068    1.08 0.018    0.55
Leverage -0.170   -4.59*** -0.129   -4.01***
Tax rate 0.003    0.35 0.004    0.60
Long Tail Lines 0.289    1.38 0.133    0.61
Product Herfindahl -0.503   -3.58*** -0.341   -1.96**
Geographic Herfindahl -0.173   -2.38** -0.156   -2.10**
ROA 0.106    0.37 0.314    1.10
Lead Company -0.036   -0.82 -0.064   -1.59
year1995 0.094    2.75*** 0.050    2.27**
year1996 0.054    1.90* 0.023    1.05
year1997 0.040    1.67* 0.009    0.48
year1998 -0.006   -0.34 -0.016   -1.25
year1999 -0.039   -2.19** -0.027   -2.36**
N
638 (120 observations left-censored
at 0, and 518 uncensored)
492 (39 observations left-censored at
0, and 453 uncensored)
Dependent Variable: net amount of produt liability reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss reserve error
Table 4C: Test for Adverse Selection - Product Liability Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loss Ratio Ceded 2514 1.689 4.200 0 28.250
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 2514 0.837 1.062 0 8.241
Auto Liability Reinsurance 2514 0.250 0.300 0 0.980
External Auto Reinsurance Ratio 2514 0.674 0.561 -12.983 1
Sustain 2052 0.726 0.329 0 1
Rherf 2052 0.445 0.311 0.026 1
Experience Ratingt-1 2514 1.239 0.210 0.692 1.999
Retention Limitt-1 2514 0.653 0.302 0.024 0.999
Firm size 2514 18.971 1.767 15.108 25.107
Auto Liab. Concentration 2514 0.310 0.206 0 0.987
Auto premium growth rate 2514 0.033 0.376 -0.828 2.197
Firm premium growth rate 2514 0.066 0.207 -0.443 1.110
Leverage 2514 1.510 0.792 0.149 4.479
Tax rate 2514 0.238 0.774 -4.779 3.041
Mutual 2514 0.300 0.458 0 1
Direct 2514 0.206 0.404 0 1
Agency 2514 0.729 0.445 0 1
Rating1 2514 0.321 0.467 0 1
Rating2 2514 0.469 0.499 0 1
Rating3 2514 0.111 0.315 0 1
Rating4 2514 0.059 0.236 0 1
Long Tail Lines 2514 0.709 0.132 0.199 0.973
Product Herfindahl 2514 0.329 0.147 0.120 0.729
Geographic Herfindahl 2514 0.492 0.364 0.044 1
ROA 2514 0.025 0.035 -0.104 0.122
Age 2514 3.649 0.885 0 5.328
Lead Company 2512 0.438 0.496 0 1
Year 2514 1997.536 1.702 1995 2000
Table 5A: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance for Moral Hazard Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles:  loss ratio ceded, loss ratio cededt-1, auto
liability reinsurance, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, auto liability premiums growth rate, firm premiums
growth rate,  leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, and ROA.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loss Ratio Ceded 2467 0.843 1.332 0 8.625
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 2467 0.622 0.793 0 4.769
Homeowners Reinsurance 2467 0.299 0.286 0 0.971
External Ho. Reinsurance Ratio 2467 0.724 0.446 -1.805 6.807
Sustain 2001 0.761 0.303 0 1
Rherf 2001 0.419 0.309 0.018 1
Experience Ratingt-1 2467 1.404 0.507 0.623 4.016
Retention Limitt-1 2467 0.617 0.284 0.028 0.991
Firm size 2467 18.814 1.939 13.318 24.358
Homeowners Concentration 2467 0.203 0.182 0.000 0.967
Ho. premium growth rate 2467 0.076 0.226 -0.520 1.371
Firm premium growth rate 2467 0.057 0.166 -0.359 0.980
Leverage 2467 1.309 0.664 0.084 3.075
Tax rate 2467 0.260 0.688 -3.531 3.593
Mutual 2467 0.429 0.495 0 1
Direct 2467 0.179 0.383 0 1
Agency 2467 0.776 0.417 0 1
Rating1 2467 0.298 0.457 0 1
Rating2 2467 0.502 0.500 0 1
Rating3 2467 0.126 0.332 0 1
Rating4 2467 0.034 0.180 0 1
Long Tail Lines 2467 0.735 0.152 0.118 0.979
Product Herfindahl 2467 0.301 0.133 0.117 0.797
Geographic Herfindahl 2467 0.523 0.374 0.043 1
ROA 2467 0.025 0.034 -0.097 0.115
Age 2467 3.920 0.850 0 5.328
Lead Company 2465 0.516 0.500 0 1
Coastal States 2467 0.470 0.499 0 1
Year 2467 1997.584 1.678 1995 2000
Table 5B: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Homeowners Reinsurance for Moral Hazard Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles:  loss ratio ceded, loss ratio cededt-1,
homeowners reinsurance, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, homeowners premiums growth rate, firm premiums
growth rate,  leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, and ROA.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loss Ratio Ceded 828 1.912 3.567 0 21.737
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 828 1.009 2.070 0 14.391
Product Liability Reinsurance 828 0.280 0.310 0.000 0.973
External prod. Reinsurance Ratio 828 0.671 0.475 -0.957 5.284
Sustain 601 0.788 0.272 0 1
Rherf 601 0.272 0.227 0.018 1
Experience Ratingt-1 828 1.988 2.187 0.338 15.742
Retention Limitt-1 828 0.591 0.290 0.026 0.999
Firm size 828 19.974 1.495 16.411 23.877
Prod. Liab. Concentration 828 0.024 0.054 0.000 1
Prod. premium growth rate 828 0.096 0.696 -0.740 5.413
Firm premium growth rate 828 0.058 0.169 -0.315 0.924
Leverage 828 1.124 0.548 0.095 2.631
Tax rate 828 0.200 0.900 -5.619 3.431
Mutual 828 0.211 0.409 0 1
Direct 828 0.071 0.257 0 1
Agency 828 0.809 0.393 0 1
Rating1 828 0.464 0.499 0 1
Rating2 828 0.470 0.499 0 1
Rating3 828 0.051 0.220 0 1
Rating4 828 0.011 0.104 0 1
Long Tail Lines 828 0.768 0.135 0.311 1.000
Product Herfindahl 828 0.251 0.125 0.108 0.801
Geographic Herfindahl 828 0.232 0.248 0.036 1
ROA 828 0.027 0.030 -0.071 0.122
Age 828 3.822 0.860 0 5.328
Lead Company 828 0.350 0.477 0 1
Year 828 1997.514 1.685 1995 2000
Table 5C: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Product Liability Reinsurance for Moral Hazard Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles:  loss ratio ceded, loss ratio cededt-1, product
liability reinsurance, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, product liability premiums growth rate, firm premiums
growth rate,  leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, and ROA.
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Loss Ratio Ceded Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > |Z|
Sample Average Treatment Effect 0.978 0.118 8.320 0.000 0.748 1.209
Number of Observations 2512 4
Loss Ratio Ceded Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > |Z|
Sample Average Treatment Effect 0.694 0.092 7.550 0.000 0.514 0.874
Number of Observations 2050 4Number of Matches
Note: Treatment variable is group affiliation. Matching variables are external auto liability reinsurance ratio, loss
ratio cededt-1, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, firm size, auto liability concentration, auto liability premiums
growth rate, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines, product Herfindahl, geographic
Herfindahl, ROA, and lead company. STATA command nnmatch  is used to estimate the sample average treatment
effect, and the bias-corrected matching estimator and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
Note: Treatment variable is group affiliation. Matching variables are external auto liability reinsurance ratio, loss
ratio cededt-1, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, SUSTAIN, RHERF, firm size, auto liability concentration, auto
liability premiums growth rate, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines, product Herfindahl,
geographic Herfindahl, ROA, and lead company. STATA command nnmatch  is used to estimate the sample average
treatment effect, and the bias-corrected matching estimator and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are
used.
Number of Matches
Table 6B: (Sample with SUSTAIN and RHERF)
Dependent Variable: Loss Ratio Ceded of Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance
[ 95% Confidence Interval ]
 Matching Estimators - Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance
Table 6A: (Full Sample without SUSTAIN and RHERF)
Dependent Variable: Loss Ratio Ceded of Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance
[ 95% Confidence Interval ]
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Loss Ratio Ceded Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > |Z|
Sample Average Treatment Effect -0.226 0.069 -3.280 0.001 -0.361 -0.091
Number of Observations 2463 4
Loss Ratio Ceded Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > |Z|
Sample Average Treatment Effect -0.025 0.059 -0.420 0.677 -0.141 0.091
Number of Observations 1997 4
[ 95% Confidence Interval ]
Number of Matches
Note: Treatment variable is group affiliation. Matching variables are external homeowners reinsurance ratio, loss
ratio cededt-1, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, SUSTAIN, RHERF, firm size, homeowners concentration,
homeowners premiums growth rate, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines, product
Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, ROA, coastal states, and lead company. STATA command nnmatch  is used to
estimate the sample average treatment effect, and the bias-corrected matching estimator and heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are used.
Number of Matches
Note: Treatment variable is group affiliation. Matching variables are external homeowners reinsurance ratio, loss
ratio cededt-1, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, firm size, homeowners concentration, homeowners premiums
growth rate, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines, product Herfindahl, geographic
Herfindahl, ROA, coastal states, and lead company. STATA command nnmatch  is used to estimate the sample
average treatment effect, and the bias-corrected matching estimator and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
are used.
Table 7B: (Sample with SUSTAIN and RHERF)
Dependent Variable: Loss Ratio Ceded of Homeowners Reinsurance
 Matching Estimators - Homeowners Reinsurance
Table 7A: (Full Sample without SUSTAIN and RHERF)
Dependent Variable: Loss Ratio Ceded of Homeowners Reinsurance
[ 95% Confidence Interval ]
91
Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 51.128    2.29** 46.977    1.77*
External Auto Reinsurance Ratio -0.026   -0.17 -0.045   -0.37
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 0.292    1.40 0.053    0.22
Experience Ratingt-1 1.047    1.46 0.590    0.99
Retention Limitt-1 0.538    0.52 -0.151   -0.16
Sustain -0.370   -0.77
Rherf -1.510   -1.09
Firm size -2.625   -2.31** -2.261   -1.66*
Auto Liab. Concentration -10.047   -3.32*** -7.753   -2.69***
Auto premium growth rate 0.257    0.71 0.105    0.32
Firm premium growth rate -1.177   -1.80* -0.427   -0.59
Leverage -0.007   -0.02 -0.359   -1.08
Tax rate -0.203   -1.44 0.059    0.45
Long Tail Lines 1.717    0.58 2.906    0.86
Product Herfindahl 5.311    1.94* -1.235   -0.67
Geographic Herfindahl 1.203    0.74 0.233    0.13
ROA 3.639    1.03 6.199    1.67*
Lead Company 1.083    2.52** 0.502    1.30
year1995 -2.998   -5.36*** -1.716   -2.96***
year1996 -2.553   -5.66*** -1.299   -2.87***
year1997 -1.683   -4.05*** -0.639   -1.53
year1998 -1.223   -3.09*** -0.295   -0.80
year1999 -1.233   -3.76*** -0.122   -0.45
R2 (within) 8.68% 6.03%
N 2121 1661
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 8A: Test for Moral Hazard - Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance 
Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of private passenger auto liability reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 0.160    0.06 1.842    0.55
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 -0.009   -1.08 -0.003   -0.35
Experience Ratingt-1 -0.124   -1.27 -0.137   -1.22
Retention Limitt-1 -0.046   -0.19 -0.037   -0.13
Sustain 0.151    1.65
Rherf 0.132    1.23
Firm size 0.120    1.33 0.021    0.18
Mutual 0.767    4.14*** 0.644    3.89***
Direct -0.067   -0.93 -0.061   -0.77
Agency 0.072    1.33 0.051    0.91
Rating1 -1.355   -1.17 -1.268   -1.13
Rating2 -1.283   -1.10 -1.255   -1.11
Rating3 -1.264   -1.05 -1.228   -1.04
Rating4 -1.714   -1.08 -1.700   -1.08
Age -0.172   -1.53 -0.142   -1.10
Lead Company 0.108    0.87 0.132    1.05
R2 (within) 6.51% 7.47%
N 2121 1661
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cThe instrumental variables for External Auto Liability Reinsurance Ratio  are mutual, direct, agency, A.M.Best's
rating dummies, age, and lead company.
Exogeneity Test for External Auto Liability Reinsurance Ratio
Table 8B: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: external  auto liability reinsurance ratio
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 51.591    2.30** 46.427    1.77*
External Auto Reinsurance Ratio 0.496    1.02 0.491    1.07
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 0.295    1.42 0.054    0.22
Experience Ratingt-1 1.107    1.53 0.659    1.10
Retention Limitt-1 0.536    0.52 -0.153   -0.17
Sustain -0.465   -0.92
Rherf -1.570   -1.12
Firm size -2.669   -2.33** -2.249   -1.66*
Auto Liab. Concentration -10.114   -3.32*** -7.871   -2.71***
Auto premium growth rate 0.258    0.71 0.110    0.33
Firm premium growth rate -1.176   -1.80* -0.429   -0.59
Leverage -0.013   -0.04 -0.364   -1.09
Tax rate -0.202   -1.43 0.061    0.46
Long Tail Lines 1.777    0.60 2.979    0.88
Product Herfindahl 5.226    1.90* -1.373   -0.74
Geographic Herfindahl 1.252    0.76 0.289    0.16
ROA 3.664    1.04 6.213    1.68*
Lead Company 1.029    2.39** 0.438    1.13
year1995 -3.010   -5.36*** -1.720   -2.96***
year1996 -2.568   -5.68*** -1.308   -2.89***
year1997 -1.695   -4.07*** -0.644   -1.54
year1998 -1.235   -3.11*** -0.302   -0.82
year1999 -1.233   -3.75*** -0.122   -0.45
Residualsc -0.556   -1.00 -0.572   -1.10
R2 (within) 8.71% 6.07%
N 2121 1661
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cResiduals are the combined residuals from the fixed-effects GLS regression of External Auto Liability Reinsurance
Ratio  reported in Table 8C. If the coefficient on Residuals  is not significant, we find evidence that  External Auto
Liability Reinsurance Ratio  is exogenous in the  fixed-effects GLS regression of Loss Ratio Ceded .  This
exogeneity test is used by Laffont and Matoussi (1995).
Exogeneity Test for External Auto Liability Reinsurance Ratio
Table 8C: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of private passenger auto liability reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 0.692    0.21 0.993    0.21
External Ho. Reinsurance Ratio 0.089    0.42 0.105    0.49
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 -0.221   -4.54*** -0.280   -6.10***
Experience Ratingt-1 -0.124   -1.65* -0.181   -2.20**
Retention Limitt-1 0.102    0.56 0.139    0.63
Sustain 0.145    1.46
Rherf 0.011    0.04
Firm size -0.007   -0.04 -0.024   -0.10
Homeowners Concentration -0.241   -0.44 -0.264   -0.40
Ho. premium growth rate -0.115   -1.11 -0.082   -0.57
Firm premium growth rate 0.050    0.44 0.063    0.39
Leverage -0.095   -1.30 -0.123   -1.34
Tax rate -0.040   -1.12 0.000   -0.01
Long Tail Lines 0.817    1.34 0.830    1.07
Product Herfindahl -0.075   -0.20 0.391    0.63
Geographic Herfindahl 0.127    0.31 -0.018   -0.04
ROA -5.191   -5.02*** -4.953   -4.41***
Lead Company 0.119    0.54 0.047    0.20
Coastal States -0.323   -1.73* -0.274   -1.91*
year1995 -0.139   -1.49 -0.090   -0.75
year1996 0.002    0.03 0.014    0.15
year1997 -0.173   -2.87*** -0.183   -2.49**
year1998 0.178    2.39** 0.187    2.19**
year1999 0.081    1.33 0.048    0.74
R2 (within) 11.14% 12.68%
N 1864 1402
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 9A: Test for Moral Hazard - Homeowners Reinsurance 
Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of homeowners reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.765    2.18** 3.166    3.13***
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 0.005    0.86 0.009    1.18
Experience Ratingt-1 0.004    0.15 0.014    0.47
Retention Limitt-1 0.149    2.29** 0.190    2.65***
Sustain 0.023    0.91
Rherf 0.045    0.66
Firm size -0.067   -1.57 -0.138   -2.60***
Mutual -0.069   -7.73*** -0.075   -7.12***
Direct 0.050    0.68 0.042    0.54
Agency 0.075    1.25 0.064    1.03
Rating1 -0.232   -2.11** -0.178   -1.69*
Rating2 -0.207   -1.88* -0.143   -1.37
Rating3 -0.182   -1.76* -0.151   -1.55
Rating4 -0.224   -2.15** -0.216   -2.16***
Age -0.018   -0.77 -0.024   -0.98
Lead Company 0.170    0.83 0.159    0.77
Coastal States -0.005   -0.59 -0.024   -1.46
R2 (within) 6.22% 7.99%
N 1864 1402
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cThe instrumental variables for External Homeowners Reinsurance Ratio  are mutual, direct, agency, A.M.Best's
rating dummies, and age.
Exogeneity Test for External Homeowners Reinsurance Ratio
Table 9B: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: external homeowners reinsurance ratio
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept -0.545   -0.14 -3.299   -0.53
External Ho. Reinsurance Ratio 0.739    0.91 1.391    1.20
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 -0.226   -4.55*** -0.294   -6.27***
Experience Ratingt-1 -0.126   -1.67* -0.198   -2.35**
Retention Limitt-1 0.002    0.01 -0.103   -0.36
Sustain 0.110    1.01
Rherf -0.041   -0.15
Firm size 0.049    0.26 0.180    0.59
Homeowners Concentration -0.221   -0.41 -0.243   -0.37
Ho. premium growth rate -0.112   -1.08 -0.078   -0.53
Firm premium growth rate 0.052    0.45 0.067    0.42
Leverage -0.097   -1.32 -0.128   -1.38
Tax rate -0.040   -1.13 -0.002   -0.06
Long Tail Lines 0.819    1.35 0.813    1.05
Product Herfindahl -0.068   -0.18 0.374    0.61
Geographic Herfindahl 0.136    0.33 0.001    0
ROA -5.206   -5.03*** -4.984   -4.43***
Lead Company 0.017    0.07 -0.147   -0.51
Coastal States -0.313   -1.66* -0.242   -1.62
year1995 -0.141   -1.50 -0.085   -0.71
year1996 0.000    0 0.015    0.17
year1997 -0.175   -2.88*** -0.182   -2.48**
year1998 0.176    2.36** 0.187    2.19**
year1999 0.080    1.32 0.046    0.72
Residualsc -0.663   -0.79 -1.307   -1.11
R2 (within) 11.17% 12.76%
N 1864 1402
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cResiduals are the combined residuals from the fixed-effects GLS regression of External Homeowners Reinsurance
Ratio  reported in Table 9C. If the coefficient on Residuals  is not significant, we find evidence that  External
Homeowners Reinsurance Ratio  is exogenous in the  fixed-effects GLS regression of Loss Ratio Ceded . This
exogeneity test is used by Laffont and Matoussi (1995).
Exogeneity Test for External Homeowners Reinsurance Ratio
Table 9C: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of homeowners reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 33.179    1.32 -10.228   -0.53
External Prod. Reinsurance Ratio 0.095    0.31 0.403    1.04
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 0.321    2.06** 0.170    0.95
Experience Ratingt-1 0.143    1.24 0.032    0.28
Retention Limitt-1 2.579    1.82* 2.903    1.74*
Sustain 0.693    1.00
Rherf -0.048   -0.06
Firm size -1.644   -1.27 0.592    0.59
Prod. Liab. Concentration -1.980   -0.17 8.970    1.14
Prod. premium growth rate 0.035    0.16 0.087    0.23
Firm premium growth rate 1.249    1.20 2.397    2.11**
Leverage -0.163   -0.21 -0.059   -0.07
Tax rate 0.052    0.66 0.030    0.28
Long Tail Lines -1.085   -0.32 -5.148   -1.52
Product Herfindahl 2.942    0.89 0.908    0.33
Geographic Herfindahl -2.402   -1.07 -1.476   -0.67
ROA 2.981    0.68 2.108    0.41
Lead Company 1.473    1.23 0.953    0.91
year1995 -1.145   -2.07** -0.158   -0.28
year1996 -0.789   -1.28 0.072    0.11
year1997 0.089    0.17 1.029    1.92*
year1998 -0.020   -0.04 0.860    1.67*
year1999 0.306    0.83 0.803    1.86*
R2 (within) 8.57% 8.61%
N 789 563
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 10A: Test for Moral Hazard - Product Liability Reinsurance 
Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of product liability reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept -1.833   -1.35 -2.234   -1.32
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 -0.004   -0.76 -0.006   -1.14
Experience Ratingt-1 -0.002   -0.26 0.004    0.46
Retention Limitt-1 0.364    3.02*** 0.084    0.69
Sustain 0.013    0.22
Rherf -0.036   -0.41
Firm size 0.042    0.59 0.066    0.81
Mutual -0.001   -0.06 0.022    1.04
Direct 0.150    3.21*** 0.106    1.61
Agency 0.231    3.09*** 0.249    2.37**
Rating1 0.073    0.40 (dropped)
Rating2 0.108    0.60 0.130    2.40**
Rating3 (dropped) 0.033    0.19
Rating4 (dropped) (dropped)
Age 0.320    1.87* 0.350    1.55
Lead Company -0.203   -1.91* -0.176   -1.40
R2 (within) 3.92% 3.23%
N 789 563
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cThe instrumental variables for External product Liability Reinsurance Ratio  are mutual, direct, agency, A.M.Best's
rating dummies, and age.
Exogeneity Test for External Product Liability Reinsurance Ratio
Table 10B: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: external  product liability reinsurance ratio
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 33.668    1.32 -8.928   -0.45
External Prod. Reinsurance Ratio 0.768    0.09 3.418    0.57
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 0.324    2.12** 0.186    1.06
Experience Ratingt-1 0.144    1.23 0.023    0.20
Retention Limitt-1 2.336    0.74 2.536    1.60
Sustain 0.580    0.93
Rherf 0.032    0.04
Firm size -1.688   -1.22 0.425    0.40
Prod. Liab. Concentration -2.002   -0.17 8.872    1.12
Prod. premium growth rate 0.033    0.15 0.077    0.20
Firm premium growth rate 1.245    1.20 2.349    2.10**
Leverage -0.172   -0.23 -0.089   -0.11
Tax rate 0.053    0.66 0.037    0.34
Long Tail Lines -1.085   -0.32 -5.343   -1.54
Product Herfindahl 3.024    0.87 1.169    0.38
Geographic Herfindahl -2.355   -1.00 -1.226   -0.53
ROA 2.909    0.67 1.878    0.37
Lead Company 1.589    0.89 1.392    1.08
year1995 -1.117   -1.61 -0.029   -0.05
year1996 -0.767   -1.11 0.184    0.27
year1997 0.106    0.18 1.090    1.98**
year1998 -0.012   -0.02 0.900    1.70*
year1999 0.311    0.79 0.826    1.87*
Residualsc -0.677   -0.08 -3.073   -0.51
R2 (within) 8.57% 8.78%
N 789 563
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cResiduals are the combined residuals from the fixed-effects GLS regression of External Product Liability
Reinsurance Ratio  reported in Table 10C. If the coefficient on Residuals  is not significant, we find evidence that
External Product Liability Reinsurance Ratio  is exogenous in the fixed-effects GLS regression of Loss Ratio
Ceded .  This exogeneity test is used by Laffont and Matoussi (1995).
Exogeneity Test for External Product Liability Reinsurance Ratio
Table 10C: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of product liability reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.704    8.53*** 1.272    6.83***
Future loss ratio volatility 0.070    0.62 0.052    0.51
Sustain -0.009   -0.67
Rherf -0.002   -0.07
Experience Ratingt-1 0.010    0.36 0.027    1.02
Retention Limitt-1 -0.318   -6.27*** -0.354   -7.34***
Firm size -0.054   -8.45*** -0.038   -5.57***
Auto Concentration 0.294    2.48** 0.094    1.16
Auto premium growth rate 0.006    0.20 -0.012   -0.52
Firm premium growth rate 0.121    2.98*** 0.130    3.59***
Leverage -0.076   -7.46*** -0.068   -5.58***
Tax rate 0.004    0.72 0.002    0.33
Long Tail Lines -0.045   -0.34 0.026    0.22
Product Herfindahl -0.180   -1.22 -0.003   -0.02
Geographic Herfindahl -0.152   -4.04*** -0.047   -1.37
ROA 0.288    2.20** 0.109    0.88
Lead Company -0.070   -2.47** -0.040   -1.57
year1995 0.006    0.39 0.018    1.38
year1996 -0.009   -0.68 0.007    0.61
year1997 -0.023   -1.73* -0.012   -1.08
year1998 -0.016   -1.47 -0.015   -1.52
year1999 -0.018   -2.07** -0.015   -1.97**
N
Table 11A: Test for Adverse Selection - Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
Dependent Variable: net amount of private passenger auto liability reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by future loss ratio volatility
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
2419 (262 observations left-censored
at 0, and 2157 uncensored)
1957 (110 observations left-censored
at 0, and 1857 uncensored)
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.412    8.10*** 1.037    7.58***
Future loss ratio volatility 0.028    1.13 0.039    1.70*
Sustain -0.007   -0.50
Rherf 0.024    0.88
Experience Ratingt-1 0.019    2.52** 0.023    3.17***
Retention Limitt-1 -0.192   -6.08*** -0.216   -6.98***
Firm size -0.041   -4.94*** -0.025   -4.80***
Homeowners Concentration -0.052   -0.60 -0.071   -1.01
Ho. premium growth rate -0.002   -0.06 -0.031   -1.13
Firm premium growth rate 0.082    2.23** 0.151    3.30***
Leverage -0.071   -5.57*** -0.064   -5.05***
Tax rate -0.001   -0.13 0.002    0.57
Long Tail Lines -0.003   -0.04 -0.049   -0.60
Product Herfindahl -0.186   -2.10** -0.118   -1.31
Geographic Herfindahl -0.079   -2.06** -0.017   -0.60
ROA 0.293    2.43** 0.201    1.78*
Lead Company -0.109   -3.89*** -0.076   -2.99***
Coastal States 0.016    0.89 0.035    2.05**
year1995 0.013    1.31 0.023    2.31**
year1996 0.011    1.27 0.014    1.54
year1997 0.004    0.41 0.018    2.12**
year1998 -0.007   -0.81 0.000    0.05
year1999 -0.010   -1.44 -0.007   -1.06
N
Table 11B: Test for Adverse Selection - Homeowners Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
Dependent Variable: net amount of homeowners reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by future loss ratio volatility
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
2208(144 observations left-censored
at 0, and 2064 uncensored)
1809 (46 observations left-censored
at 0, and 1763 uncensored)
102
Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.388    3.54*** -0.064   -1.47
Future loss ratio volatility 0.028    0.48 -0.040   -0.96
Sustain -0.106   -1.89*
Rherf 0.000   -0.01
Experience Ratingt-1 0.004    0.89 -0.344   -4.37***
Retention Limitt-1 -0.345   -3.57*** -0.047   -3.12***
Firm size -0.040   -2.17** 0.363    0.33
Prod. Liab. Concentration 0.494    0.79 -0.006   -0.78
Prod. premium growth rate 0.004    0.25 0.017    0.45
Firm premium growth rate 0.074    1.28 -0.130   -3.29***
Leverage -0.172   -4.62*** 0.004    0.51
Tax rate 0.002    0.27 0.116    0.54
Long Tail Lines 0.300    1.56 -0.336   -2.85***
Product Herfindahl -0.504   -3.41*** -0.152   -1.81*
Geographic Herfindahl -0.169   -1.91** 0.301    0.99
ROA 0.154    0.53 -0.061   -1.39
Lead Company -0.037   -0.92 0.055    2.49**
year1995 0.087    2.59*** 0.027    1.35
year1996 0.052    1.73* 0.012    0.62
year1997 0.038    1.34 -0.014   -1.04
year1998 -0.008   -0.40 -0.025   -2.21**
year1999 -0.042   -2.72*** 1.712    4.84***
N
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 11C: Test for Adverse Selection - Product Liability Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
638 (120 observations left-censored
at 0, and 518 uncensored)
492 (39 observations left-censored at
0, and 453 uncensored)
Dependent Variable: net amount of produt liability reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by future loss ratio volatility
103
Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.726    8.83*** 1.290    7.07***
Loss ratio difference -0.084   -1.38 -0.088   -1.30
Sustain -0.009   -0.67
Rherf -0.001   -0.04
Experience Ratingt-1 0.005    0.17 0.020    0.73
Retention Limitt-1 -0.319   -6.36*** -0.352   -7.33***
Firm size -0.053   -8.03*** -0.037   -5.32***
Auto Concentration 0.273    2.44** 0.075    0.99
Auto premium growth rate 0.008    0.27 -0.011   -0.45
Firm premium growth rate 0.117    2.87*** 0.126    3.56***
Leverage -0.078   -7.63*** -0.070   -5.60***
Tax rate 0.003    0.65 0.002    0.34
Long Tail Lines -0.055   -0.43 0.014    0.12
Product Herfindahl -0.168   -1.20 0.007    0.07
Geographic Herfindahl -0.150   -3.90*** -0.044   -1.27
ROA 0.229    1.61 0.043    0.31
Lead Company -0.071   -2.52** -0.042   -1.70*
year1995 0.006    0.43 0.020    1.46
year1996 -0.011   -0.86 0.006    0.49
year1997 -0.023   -1.79* -0.011   -1.08
year1998 -0.017   -1.63 -0.015   -1.61
year1999 -0.019   -2.31** -0.016   -2.25**
N
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
2419 (262 observations left-censored
at 0, and 2157 uncensored)
1957 (110 observations left-censored
at 0, and 1857 uncensored)
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
Table 12A: Test for Adverse Selection - Private Passenger Auto Liability Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
Dependent Variable: net amount of private passenger auto liability reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss ratio difference
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.422    8.06*** 1.056    7.75***
Loss ratio difference 0.036    1.89* 0.029    2.20**
Sustain -0.007   -0.51
Rherf 0.023    0.84
Experience Ratingt-1 0.017    2.29** 0.022    3.01***
Retention Limitt-1 -0.192   -6.18*** -0.213   -6.68***
Firm size -0.041   -4.93*** -0.025   -4.92***
Homeowners Concentration -0.054   -0.62 -0.073   -1.06
Ho. premium growth rate 0.000   -0.01 -0.029   -1.07
Firm premium growth rate 0.084    2.26** 0.154    3.33***
Leverage -0.070   -5.63*** -0.064   -5.11***
Tax rate 0.000   -0.06 0.002    0.63
Long Tail Lines -0.005   -0.07 -0.053   -0.66
Product Herfindahl -0.183   -2.05** -0.107   -1.17
Geographic Herfindahl -0.079   -2.06** -0.018   -0.65
ROA 0.362    2.60*** 0.261    2.15**
Lead Company -0.109   -3.94*** -0.075   -2.98***
Coastal States 0.018    0.99 0.037    2.19**
year1995 0.020    1.81* 0.028    2.55**
year1996 0.008    0.91 0.011    1.24
year1997 0.007    0.73 0.019    2.40**
year1998 -0.008   -0.96 -0.002   -0.20
year1999 -0.008   -1.14 -0.005   -0.82
N
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
2208(144 observations left-censored
at 0, and 2064 uncensored)
1809 (46 observations left-censored
at 0, and 1763 uncensored)
Table 12B: Test for Adverse Selection - Homeowners Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
Dependent Variable: net amount of homeowners reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss ratio difference
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.402    3.66*** 1.674    4.98***
Loss ratio difference 0.002    0.07 0.002    0.11
Sustain -0.041   -0.99
Rherf -0.100   -1.82*
Experience Ratingt-1 0.004    0.93 0.001    0.15
Retention Limitt-1 -0.342   -3.50*** -0.347   -4.41***
Firm size -0.040   -2.22** -0.046   -3.19***
Prod. Liab. Concentration 0.490    0.75 0.385    0.36
Prod. premium growth rate 0.003    0.24 -0.006   -0.69
Firm premium growth rate 0.074    1.27 0.017    0.45
Leverage -0.172   -4.45*** -0.129   -3.26***
Tax rate 0.002    0.26 0.004    0.53
Long Tail Lines 0.294    1.55 0.132    0.61
Product Herfindahl -0.502   -3.37*** -0.339   -2.89***
Geographic Herfindahl -0.167   -1.81* -0.156   -1.81*
ROA 0.151    0.52 0.308    1.01
Lead Company -0.037   -0.92 -0.064   -1.46
year1995 0.088    2.47** 0.051    2.39**
year1996 0.053    1.68* 0.023    1.24
year1997 0.039    1.36 0.009    0.51
year1998 -0.008   -0.36 -0.016   -1.22
year1999 -0.042   -2.60*** -0.027   -2.40***
N
638 (120 observations left-censored
at 0, and 518 uncensored)
492 (39 observations left-censored at
0, and 453 uncensored)
Dependent Variable: net amount of produt liability reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss ratio difference
Table 12C: Test for Adverse Selection - Product Liability Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All-Line Reinsurance 9013 0.368 0.338 0.000 1.000
Loss reserve error 8177 0.044 0.465 -0.933 2.886
Loss ratio volatility 9013 0.137 0.160 0.021 1.166
Loss ratio difference 9013 -0.032 0.230 -0.671 0.861
Sustain 6999 0.640 0.384 0.000 1.000
Rherf 6999 0.473 0.305 0.018 1.000
Experience Ratingt-1 9013 1.585 0.930 0.584 7.516
Retention Limitt-1 9013 0.685 0.323 0.000 1.000
Firm size 9013 17.863 1.932 13.058 25.107
Firm premium growth rate 9013 0.156 0.570 -0.542 4.274
Leverage 9013 1.107 0.933 0.000 4.400
Tax rate 9013 0.289 0.656 -2.902 3.625
Long Tail Lines 9013 0.675 0.290 0 1
Product Herfindahl 9013 0.499 0.272 0.135 1
Geographic Herfindahl 9013 0.585 0.384 0.043 1
ROA 9013 0.032 0.046 -0.126 0.186
Lead Company 8950 0.419 0.493 0 1
Year 9013 1997.501 1.708 1995 2000
Table 13A: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of  All-Line Reinsurance for Adverse Selection Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles: all-line reinsurance, loss reserve error, loss
ratio volatility, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, firm premiums growth rate,  leverage, product Herfindahl,
geographic Herfindahl, long tail lines, and tax rate.
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 1.663  16.44*** 1.487  21.53***
Loss reserve error 0.031    5.21*** 0.029    4.89***
Sustain 0.010    1.49
Rherf -0.009   -0.78
Experience Ratingt-1 0.014    2.77*** 0.015    3.33***
Retention Limitt-1 -0.358 -17.67*** -0.380 -15.64***
Firm size -0.051 -10.02*** -0.042 -11.62***
Firm premium growth rate 0.007    1.50 0.010    1.27
Leverage -0.091 -15.40*** -0.078 -12.12***
Tax rate 0.001    0.21 0.002    0.63
Long Tail Lines 0.137    6.15*** 0.076    3.16***
Product Herfindahl -0.177   -6.25*** -0.129   -6.03***
Geographic Herfindahl -0.153   -7.12*** -0.078   -3.92***
ROA 0.243    4.08*** 0.182    2.99***
Lead Company -0.053   -4.45*** -0.052   -4.72***
year1995 0.018    2.99*** 0.014    2.08**
year1996 0.012    2.32** 0.007    1.35
year1997 0.006    1.11 0.004    0.84
year1998 0.001    0.20 0.000   -0.06
year1999 -0.008   -1.85* -0.010   -2.53**
N
8116 (668 observations left-censored
at 0, 7446 observations uncensored,
and 2 right-censored at 1).
6622 (121 observations left-censored
at 0, and 6500 observations
uncensored.
Dependent Variable: net amount of all-line reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss reserve error
Table 13B: Test for Adverse Selection - All-Line Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 2.130  21.48*** 1.762  22.89***
Future loss ratio volatility 0.050    1.96** 0.064    2.24**
Sustain 0.000   -0.07
Rherf 0.001    0.10
Experience Ratingt-1 0.012    2.97*** 0.013    2.76***
Retention Limitt-1 -0.426 -18.74*** -0.407 -19.58***
Firm size -0.069 -12.60*** -0.053 -13.15***
Firm premium growth rate 0.005    0.87 0.007    1.10
Leverage -0.124 -21.93*** -0.105 -16.76***
Tax rate -0.001   -0.49 0.000   -0.13
Long Tail Lines 0.145    4.99*** 0.088    3.48***
Product Herfindahl -0.193   -8.32*** -0.131   -5.57***
Geographic Herfindahl -0.168   -7.47*** -0.103   -5.69***
ROA 0.373    5.63*** 0.305    4.96***
Lead Company -0.082   -7.19*** -0.070   -5.46***
year1995 0.018    2.64*** 0.010    1.51
year1996 0.014    2.09** 0.007    1.19
year1997 0.005    0.89 0.002    0.46
year1998 0.000   -0.09 -0.002   -0.32
year1999 -0.009   -2.14** -0.012   -2.83***
N
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Table 13C: Test for Adverse Selection - All-Line Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
8950 (668 observations left-censored
at 0, 7447 observations uncensored,
and 835 right-censored at 1).
6956 (121 observations left-censored
at 0, 6500 observations uncensored,
and 335 right-censored at 1.
Dependent Variable: net amount of all-line reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by future loss ratio volatility
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 2.170  22.55*** 1.822  23.47***
Loss ratio difference 0.064    4.58*** 0.068    6.44***
Sustain 0.000    0.02
Rherf -0.002   -0.20
Experience Ratingt-1 0.014    3.20*** 0.015    3.06***
Retention Limitt-1 -0.427 -18.58*** -0.408 -19.34***
Firm size -0.071 -13.30*** -0.055 -13.53***
Firm premium growth rate 0.006    0.90 0.008    1.14
Leverage -0.123 -21.78*** -0.104 -17.07***
Tax rate -0.001   -0.38 0.000    0.04
Long Tail Lines 0.137    4.61*** 0.079    3.11***
Product Herfindahl -0.192   -8.28*** -0.130   -5.54***
Geographic Herfindahl -0.170   -7.72*** -0.105   -5.73***
ROA 0.442    6.24*** 0.384    5.79***
Lead Company -0.082   -7.16*** -0.070   -5.44***
year1995 0.017    2.43** 0.008    1.26
year1996 0.010    1.41 0.002    0.40
year1997 0.004    0.76 0.001    0.22
year1998 -0.004   -0.76 -0.006   -1.11
year1999 -0.010   -2.31** -0.013   -3.06***
N
8950 (668 observations left-censored
at 0, 7447 observations uncensored,
and 835 right-censored at 1).
6956 (121 observations left-censored
at 0, 6500 observations uncensored,
and 335 right-censored at 1.
Dependent Variable: net amount of all-line reinsurance 
Risk of primary insurer is measured by loss ratio difference
Table 13D: Test for Adverse Selection - All-Line Reinsurance 
Random-effects Tobit regression  with bootstrap standard errors 
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
aSTATA command xttobit  is used here to exploit the panel data feature of our dataset.
bZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
c***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loss Ratio Ceded 8286 1.103 2.047 0 16.499
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 8286 0.692 0.563 0 3.808
All-Line Reinsurance 8286 0.323 0.285 0 0.976
External Reinsurance Ratio 8286 0.744 0.500 -18.960 19.329
Sustain 6993 0.658 0.373 0 1
Rherf 6993 0.472 0.306 0.018 1
Experience Ratingt-1 8286 1.570 0.868 0.651 7.114
Retention Limitt-1 8286 0.613 0.282 0.000 0.998
Firm size 8286 18.066 1.893 12.797 25.107
Firm premium growth rate 8286 0.141 0.483 -0.518 3.480
Leverage 8286 1.217 0.893 0.009 4.401
Tax rate 8286 0.294 0.708 -3.201 3.909
Mutual 8286 0.292 0.455 0 1
Direct 8286 0.202 0.402 0 1
Agency 8286 0.649 0.477 0 1
Rating1 8286 0.229 0.420 0 1
Rating2 8286 0.448 0.497 0 1
Rating3 8286 0.126 0.332 0 1
Rating4 8286 0.041 0.198 0 1
Long Tail Lines 8286 0.686 0.284 0 1
Product Herfindahl 8286 0.491 0.271 0.133 1
Geographic Herfindahl 8286 0.572 0.384 0.043 1
ROA 8286 0.029 0.046 -0.132 0.175
Age 8286 3.337 1.078 0 5.338
Lead Company 8218 0.454 0.498 0 1
Year 8286 1997.477 1.708 1995 2000
Table 14A: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of All-Line Reinsurance for Moral Hazard Test
aThe following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles:  loss ratio ceded, loss ratio cededt-1, all-line
reinsurance, experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, firm premiums growth rate,  leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines,
product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, and ROA.
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Loss Ratio Ceded Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > |Z|
Sample Average Treatment Effect 0.032 0.018 1.730 0.084 -0.004 0.068
Number of Observations 8209 4
Loss Ratio Ceded Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > |Z|
Sample Average Treatment Effect 0.022 0.019 1.170 0.240 -0.015 0.059
Number of Observations 6928 4
 Matching Estimators - All-Line Reinsurance
Table 14B-1: (Full Sample without SUSTAIN and RHERF)
Dependent Variable: Loss Ratio Ceded of All-Line Reinsurance
[ 95% Confidence Interval ]
[ 95% Confidence Interval ]
Number of Matches
Note: Treatment variable is group affiliation. Matching variables are external reinsurance ratio, loss ratio cededt-1,
experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, SUSTAIN, RHERF, firm size, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate,
long-tail lines, product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, ROA, and lead company. STATA command nnmatch  is
used to estimate the sample average treatment effect, and the bias-corrected matching estimator and
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
Number of Matches
Note: Treatment variable is group affiliation. Matching variables are external reinsurance ratio, loss ratio cededt-1,
experience ratingt-1, retention limitt-1, firm size, firm premiums growth rate, leverage, tax rate, long-tail lines,
product Herfindahl, geographic Herfindahl, ROA, and lead company. STATA command nnmatch  is used to
estimate the sample average treatment effect, and the bias-corrected matching estimator and heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are used.
Table 14B-2: (Sample with SUSTAIN and RHERF)
Dependent Variable: Loss Ratio Ceded of All-Line Reinsurance
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 0.226    0.36 0.358    0.46
External Reinsurance Ratio -0.030   -0.51 0.005    0.09
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 -0.038   -0.81 -0.019   -0.39
Experience Ratingt-1 -0.027   -0.94 0.007    0.22
Retention Limitt-1 0.087    1.33 0.117    1.67*
Sustain -0.026   -0.92
Rherf 0.021    0.25
Firm size 0.034    1.03 0.027    0.66
Firm premium growth rate -0.018   -0.92 -0.021   -1.15
Leverage -0.006   -0.35 -0.024   -1.33
Tax rate -0.007   -0.67 -0.007   -0.52
Long Tail Lines -0.051   -0.37 -0.119   -0.89
Product Herfindahl 0.074    0.58 0.171    0.98
Geographic Herfindahl -0.113   -0.95 -0.256   -1.75*
ROA -1.391   -5.71*** -1.431   -5.19***
Lead Company 0.116    1.17 0.110    1.18
year1995 -0.104   -4.19*** -0.099   -3.17***
year1996 -0.079   -3.39*** -0.076   -2.72***
year1997 -0.114   -6.07*** -0.118   -5.26***
year1998 0.047    2.15** 0.057    2.28**
year1999 0.018    1.06 -0.003   -0.18
R2 (within) 4.38% 4.61%
N 5721 4547
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
Exogeneity Test for External All-Line Reinsurance Ratio
Table 14C: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of all-line reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 0.600    1.70* 0.799    1.77*
Loss Ratio Ceded t-1 -0.009   -1.34 -0.007   -0.87
Experience Rating t-1 0.006    0.76 0.005    0.52
Retention Limitt-1 0.160    4.86*** 0.197    5.09***
Sustain 0.057    3.75***
Rherf 0.062    1.55
Firm size -0.001   -0.04 -0.008   -0.32
Mutual 0.045    0.32 0.029    0.23
Direct 0.015    0.39 0.022    0.53
Agency 0.021    0.44 0.034    0.61
Rating1 -0.188   -4.23*** -0.187   -3.76***
Rating2 -0.160   -3.77*** -0.147   -3.19***
Rating3 -0.100   -2.42** -0.092   -2.04**
Rating4 -0.100   -2.03** -0.103   -2.07**
Age -0.043   -2.31** -0.068   -2.77***
Lead Company 0.076    1.24 0.094    1.61
R2 (within) 4.29% 5.98%
N 5721 4547
Exogeneity Test for External All-Line Reinsurance Ratio
Table 14D: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: external  all-line reinsurance ratio
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cThe instrumental variables for External All-Line Reinsurance Ratio  are mutual, direct, agency, A.M.Best's rating
dummies, and age.
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Independent Variables Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept 0.028    0.04 -0.175   -0.22
External Reinsurance Ratio 0.321    0.95 0.696    2.21**
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 -0.035   -0.74 -0.016   -0.32
Experience Ratingt-1 -0.029   -1.05 0.001    0.04
Retention Limitt-1 0.029    0.36 -0.027   -0.28
Sustain -0.064   -1.83*
Rherf -0.025   -0.29
Firm size 0.039    1.19 0.045    1.09
Firm premium growth rate -0.019   -0.95 -0.022   -1.21
Leverage -0.008   -0.43 -0.028   -1.55
Tax rate -0.007   -0.64 -0.007   -0.51
Long Tail Lines -0.053   -0.38 -0.125   -0.94
Product Herfindahl 0.069    0.54 0.170    0.97
Geographic Herfindahl -0.115   -0.97 -0.268   -1.83*
ROA -1.394   -5.72*** -1.447   -5.24***
Lead Company 0.092    0.91 0.050    0.52
year1995 -0.110   -4.22*** -0.111   -3.45***
year1996 -0.084   -3.53*** -0.088   -3.06***
year1997 -0.119   -6.14*** -0.128   -5.58***
year1998 0.044    2.00** 0.050    2.01**
year1999 0.016    0.94 -0.008   -0.43
Residualsc -0.358   -1.07 -0.704   -2.22**
R2 (within) 4.42% 4.75%
N 5721 4547
Exogeneity Test for External All-Line Reinsurance Ratio
Table 14E: Fixed-effects GLS regression  with robust standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of all-line reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
aZ-statistics are calculated with White standard errors, which are corrected for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
cResiduals are the combined residuals from the fixed-effects GLS regression of External All-Line Reinsurance Ratio
reported in Table 12D. If the coefficient on Residuals  is not significant, we find evidence that  External All-Line
Reinsurance Ratio  is exogenous in the fixed-effects GLS regression of Loss Ratio Ceded .  This exogeneity test is
used by Laffont and Matoussi (1995).
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Independent Variables  Coeff.  z-Stat Coeff.  z-Stat
Intercept -0.021   -0.03 -0.163   -0.18
External Reinsurance Ratio 0.377    0.95 0.769    1.98**
Loss Ratio Cededt-1 -0.034   -0.77 -0.016   -0.32
Experience Ratingt-1 -0.030   -0.82 -0.001   -0.04
Retention Limitt-1 0.019    0.25 -0.043   -0.36
Sustain -0.062   -2.01**
Rherf -0.034   -0.36
Firm size 0.042    1.02 0.046    0.96
Firm premium growth rate -0.009   -0.38 0.000    0
Leverage -0.014   -0.68 -0.039   -1.88*
Tax rate -0.007   -0.52 -0.003   -0.20
Long Tail Lines -0.070   -0.45 -0.173   -1.06
Product Herfindahl 0.055    0.38 0.145    0.84
Geographic Herfindahl -0.111   -0.88 -0.272   -1.79*
ROA -1.286   -5.53*** -1.159   -4.26***
Lead Company 0.087    0.87 0.042    0.38
year1995 -0.115   -3.22*** -0.128   -3.24***
year1996 -0.084   -2.83*** -0.090   -2.57***
year1997 -0.114   -4.88*** -0.116   -4.03***
year1998 0.048    1.95* 0.061    2.68***
year1999 0.018    0.90 -0.003   -0.14
R2 (within) 2.22%
N 5721 4547
Instrumented:
Instuments:
Table 14F: Test for Moral Hazard - All-Line Reinsurance 
Two stage least squares for panel data models with bootstrap standard errors 
Dependent Variable: loss ratio ceded of all-line reinsurance
Without SUSTAIN and RHERF With SUSTAIN and RHERF
b***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
external reinsurance ratio
mutual, direct, agency, age, and rating dummies.
aZ-statistics are calculated with bootstrap standard errors.
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